abstracts.txt

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# MIT LL Space Control Conference 2023                                        #
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 === First Submission, 12/7/2022 ===

 * What is the key result or key message of your talk?

 * What is the evidence of this result?

 * How is it different from previous results? Additionally, please
   provide keywords for categorizing your talk.

The discussions around governance of Antisatellite missiles is
primarily focused on banning testing, more specifically, banning
testing of the Direct Ascent (DA-ASAT) variety.  There are three
problems with that approach: 1) kinetic-attack debris-generating
counterspace weapons (Kinetic-ASATs) are not limited to ASAT missiles
making a ban on DA-ASAT testing a half-measure at best 2) even that
half-measure is unpallatable to Russia/China and 3) banning ASAT
missile testing does little to guard against use.  It is too late to
ban Kinetic-ASATs, but there is still time to fully relegate them to
strategic deterrents.  The entire concept and approach of Kinetic
attack must be relegated to strategic deterrence, not just the present
implementation.  1) The approach is effective providing incentive to
use them 2) There are few alternatives of similar efficacy and 3)
There is little governance of the approach.  Practical steps can be
taken to mitigate points 2 and 3 such as encouraging all parties
(including adversaries) to develop non-kinetic attacks of equal
efficacy, CNC safeguards on Kinetic-ASATs, global response policies,
international debris quotas, etc.  Attempts to ban Kinetic-ASATs are
doomed to failure, making them wasted effort and opportunity.
Harm-reducing mitigations, however, may yet succeed.  Kinetic-ASATs
cannot cause harm if they are not used, so let's make sure they stay
on the shelf, right next to the nuclear weapons.