You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
So far, the shared secret uses "Comb-Concat" as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-01#appendix-B.4.1. The same is done in OSSL111. This is suitable for inputting the shared secret to the TLS 1.3 key schedule. Compared to the implementation in OSSL111, the oqs-provider can also be used outside a TLS context. For this purpose, a method like "Comb-KDF" would be useful.
Investigate using more OSSL3 API to allow more flexible combination of hybrid schemes:
-> query algorithm parameters (secret-, ciphertext-, key-lengths) with provider API
-> define individual algorithms for hybrid KEM in an array
-> unify initialization of EVP-ECP and EVP-ECX code
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
IMHO, from practical point of view, a construct like
K = KDF (SS1 || SS2 || ... || SSn)
is hard to beat, both security-wise and simplicity-wise. I don't think we need anything more elaborated, though a few details should be written down, like fixed length of each shared secret.
Follow-up after #16:
-> query algorithm parameters (secret-, ciphertext-, key-lengths) with provider API
-> define individual algorithms for hybrid KEM in an array
-> unify initialization of EVP-ECP and EVP-ECX code
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: