Summary
A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by capsule-proxy gives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.
Details
- Tenant
solar, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner in the Namespace solar
- Tenant
wind, owned by a ServiceAccount named tenant-owner in the Namespace wind
Please, notice the same ServiceAccount name, although in different namespaces.
The Tenant owner solar would be able to list the namespaces of the Tenant wind and vice-versa, although this is not correct.
The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
capsule-proxy runs with the --disable-caching=false (default value: false)- Tenant owners are ServiceAccount, with the same resource name, but in different Namespaces.
The CVE doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.
mtheeren-asml Reporter
prometherion Coordinator
Summary
A bug in the RoleBinding reflector used by
capsule-proxygives ServiceAccount tenant owners the right to list Namespaces of other tenants backed by the same owner kind and name.Details
solar, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-ownerin the Namespacesolarwind, owned by a ServiceAccount namedtenant-ownerin the NamespacewindThe Tenant owner
solarwould be able to list the namespaces of the Tenantwindand vice-versa, although this is not correct.The bug introduces an exfiltration vulnerability since allows the listing of Namespace resources of other Tenants, although just in some specific conditions:
capsule-proxyruns with the--disable-caching=false(default value:false)The CVE doesn't allow any privilege escalation on the outer tenant Namespace-scoped resources, since the Kubernetes RBAC is enforcing this.