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Open Question: Incentivization of PoW verification (Proof-of-proof-of-work) #5

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christobias opened this issue Dec 16, 2018 · 11 comments

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@christobias
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Problem: Since the Unprll Proof-of-work is expensive to verify, sync-up is slow. Hence, shifting verification to the miner network and giving them another chance to earn ULL is a good idea. Since verification can occur in parallel, multithreaded miners can have a chance without having to resort to multiple wallets, further keeping single core mining competitive.

This thread is open for discussion on implementing such a feature

@RadiantAeon
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I say we do something similar to masternodes. However, I feel like that conflicts with a vision of 1 cpu 1 voice because people with more coin will hold more power.

@christobias
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Yes, ideally I'd make it similar to mining and keep it a competition between miners

@noxstream
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@christobias
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christobias commented Dec 17, 2018

@NoxSphere I remember seeing that page a long time ago. But that's for running a public node and not paying a verifier. I do have an idea for passive earning on Unprll, but that will have to wait for later

@noxstream
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misread oupsss ;)

@ovsiannikov
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ovsiannikov commented Dec 18, 2018

something like this https://www.veriblock.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/PoP-White-Paper.pdf
i'm find this awesome

@christobias
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That's an interesting idea, but that's for inheriting proof-of-work from other chains onto your current chain :)

@ovsiannikov
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look on it like external checkpoint storage

@christobias
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I have a potential idea for this. Ideally an algorithmic solution is preferable, but if that can't be done, a threat-based approach could be taken. Suppose a verifier wishes to get paid for verifying proofs-of-work. They will have to pledge a certain amount of his current balance as a "security deposit". Then, after a set number of blocks have passed without any invalid proofs, the verifier gets paid his original deposit and an extra amount for his services (Possibly more for any invalid blocks they did find during that timeframe). In case an invalid proof was seen (and it wasn't at the highest block at that time), all deposits are confiscated/burned.

Opinions and critique welcomed :)

@RadiantAeon
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That would benefit people who purposely broadcast invalid hashes to themselves to gain more coin.

@christobias
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Hmm, so extra payment for invalid blocks is counterproductive.

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