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Add Details for Supply Chain Use Case
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The Use Case working group generated slides describing Use Cases, this PR brings the description of the Supply Chain Use case into the website content..

Signed-off-by: James Magowan <magowan@uk.ibm.com>
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magowan committed Jan 27, 2025
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45 changes: 42 additions & 3 deletions content/en/docs/use-cases/supply-chain.md
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---
title: Secure Supply Chain
description: Securing build piplines with Confidential Containers
title: Secure Supply Chain (Trusted Pipeline)
description: A trusted CI/CD pipeline prevents malicious code from infiltrating the software and ensures that the software can be traced and verified.
categories:
- use cases
tags:
- supply chain
- build pipelines
---

Coming soon
## Background

- Compliance Frameworks require Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM)
- What was the OCI Image was built from?
- Confidential Computing requires a way to verify the OCI Images being used. (Signatures, Encrypted Layers etc.)
- Is this the OCI Image I am looking for?

Being able to verify the image is not sufficient for Confidential Computing if we do not trust the environment in which the evidence for verification was created.

**Can we ever have a Confidential Computing Environment if we do not trust the environment in which the application has been built?**

## What environment was used to
- Build the OCI Images?
- Define/Generate the SBOM we later use to inform our choice of Image?
- Sign or encrypt the Image?

## We need to use CoCo to establish a Secure Supply Chain.
- To ensure the SBOM accurately reflects how the OCI Image was built
- No ability to tamper with the build
- To protect the keys used to establish signatures or encrypt the Images.
- To make the signatures, keys, SBOMs available for use/audit purposes later.

## But considering OCI Images is not enough our Supply chain also includes:
- AI Use Cases would include training Data and AI Models
- CoCo VM (with SBOM)
- Attestation Measurements to verify the CoCo VM
- Generation and protection of Keys/Secrets/Policies/Configuration
- Trustee (KBS/Attestation) and Remote Verification Services
- Potentially updates to Firmware for the TEE in use.

### One of the key considerations for the confidential containers project is
- Transparent deployment of unmodified containers

For a Secure Supply Chain it is reasonable to conclude that in order to build the unmodified containers we should start by considered pre-existing CI/CD systems which can be deployed within a Kubernetes Environment. Such systems could be deployed to Confidential Containers with CI/CD system then securely building, signing, encrypting unmodified containers and SBOMs. One such CI/CD system being investigated is [Tekton](https://tekton.dev/docs/)

## Bootstrap Problem
This Use Case needs to consider how to solve the bootstrap problem.
- How can we use a CoCo VM to securely build a CoCo VM?


2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions styles/config/vocabularies/coco/accept.txt
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Dockerfile
ghcr
repo
SBOM[s]
Tekton

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