Merge 3371a8a into 7dc21dd

EIPS/eip-2025.md

@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Not Implemented
 
 ### Why Hardcoded Values?
 
-Why not us a smart contract with some governance mechanism to allow changing the distribution of funds? Wouldn’t that be more flexible and effective?
+Why not use a smart contract with some governance mechanism to allow changing the distribution of funds? Wouldn’t that be more flexible and effective?
 
 *TLDR: This EIP is not about governance reform*
 
@@ -164,17 +164,17 @@ After the loan, there is the option to allow the amounts (limited to less than .
 
 * **Give the Keys to the Hands of the Few (Oligarchy)**
 
-Create a multisig that allows a group of individuals to update the smart contract. The most likely candidates for this are the Core Devs themselves, but it could also be a trusted few from the community/stakeholders. No matter how you slice it, there is a fundamental issue in deciding who gets to decide. There currently is not a trusted/adopted governance mechanism to make these decisions within the Ethereum ecosytem. Also, preventing changing the contract in self interest is difficult without a well-engineered governance system of checks and balances. This EIP does not claim nor aim to solve these issues.
+Create a multisig that allows a group of individuals to update the smart contract. The most likely candidates for this are the Core Devs themselves, but it could also be a trusted few from the community/stakeholders. No matter how you slice it, there is a fundamental issue in deciding who gets to decide. There currently is not a trusted/adopted governance mechanism to make these decisions within the Ethereum ecosytem. Also, preventing changing the contract in self-interest is difficult without a well-engineered governance system of checks and balances. This EIP does not claim nor aim to solve these issues.
 
 * **Give the Keys to the Hands of the Many (Plutarchy)**
 
-Allow ethereum holders with coin votes to update the smart contract. Using holographic consensus could overcome the issue of voter turnout as it scales as participation scales, even to the size of the whole network. This has some benefits as the entire network can participate. However, the problem is that some individuals in the network are over represented -- the wealthy. Without a solution to identity that has been agreed to and implemented by the entire Ethereum Network, there is no way around giving more power in votes to the rich. This EIP does not claim, nor aim to solve these issues.
+Allow ethereum holders with coin votes to update the smart contract. Using holographic consensus could overcome the issue of voter turnout as it scales as participation scales, even to the size of the whole network. This has some benefits as the entire network can participate. However, the problem is that some individuals in the network are over-represented -- the wealthy. Without a solution to identity that has been agreed to and implemented by the entire Ethereum Network, there is no way around giving more power in votes to the rich. This EIP does not claim, nor aim to solve these issues.
 
 * **Use Ethereum Governance as it is Today**
 
 Criticisms or support aside, there is a system that governs Ethereum today. It is a mix of rough consensus among core devs, miners running nodes, clients implementing changes, and stakeholders adopting those changes. It includes yelling or not yelling on twitter and reddit. It is complicated and I don’t claim to understand it. Even without a clear view of how it works, there is evidence of its existence. This evidence is there are changes that have allowed to be implemented, and changes that have not allowed to be implemented in Ethereum.
 
-I do not aim to change Ethereum governance. Because this EIP has hardcoded values, it must go through the existing governance process, whatever that is, before it is implemented. It will then continue to operate until the end of the emission schedule. This is intentional. This makes it uncapturable. No party other then the ecosystem itself can modify the contract once it has been deployed.
+I do not aim to change Ethereum governance. Because this EIP has hardcoded values, it must go through the existing governance process, whatever that is, before it is implemented. It will then continue to operate until the end of the emission schedule. This is intentional. This makes it uncapturable. No party other than the ecosystem itself can modify the contract once it has been deployed.
 
 This EIP is not about governance reform.
 
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Historically there has been a precedent that the Ethereum Foundation is solely r
 
 I do not profess to know the best way to organize these funds. There is work already in progress to organize these efforts championed by Alexey Akhunov. The following is a quote from a [recent medium article](https://medium.com/@akhounov/ethereum-1x-as-an-attempt-to-change-the-process-783efa23cf60):
 
-> “Going from funding a few implementation teams continuously and letting them do 'their stuff' to funding more specific and temporary initiatives requires looking at funding through different lenses. How much 'due diligence' and oversight is too much (in terms of overhead), who can decide whether working groups actually deliver, etc. This is also solvable, and also more on this will come later (not in this post)."
+> "Going from funding a few implementation teams continuously and letting them do 'their stuff' to funding more specific and temporary initiatives requires looking at funding through different lenses. How much 'due diligence' and oversight is too much (in terms of overhead), who can decide whether working groups actually deliver, etc. This is also solvable, and also more on this will come later (not in this post)."
 
 My suggestion would be to create an Eth1.X core developer DAO using [DaoStack](https://daostack.io/) to coordinate membership and payment of the Core Devs, but ultimately they are capable of determining the system that works best for them. As long as the system is transparent and mature enough to distribute funds when the time comes, this is sufficient for now.
 
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ As the result of [REVES ET AL. v . ERNST YOUNG 1990](https://casetext.com/case/r
  3) The expectations of the investing public—if the investors thought they were investing in a business to make a profit on their investment, the note is more likely to be found a security.
  4) Other risk-reducing factor—if the note is collateralized or otherwise less risky than common notes, the note is less likely to be found to be a security.
 
-The loan is for the specific use of supporting Eth1.X research and development. The distribution will not be widely offered and the note will be collateralized by the network itself, provided in ETH and repaid in ETH. In coordinating the collection of these funds recognise I may be legally liable for some of this work and I will do all of the due dilegence I can, seek legal counsel, and accept any legal repercussions resulting from this work.
+The loan is for the specific use of supporting Eth1.X research and development. The distribution will not be widely offered and the note will be collateralized by the network itself, provided in ETH and repaid in ETH. In coordinating the collection of these funds recognise I may be legally liable for some of this work and I will do all the due diligence I can, seek legal counsel, and accept any legal repercussions resulting from this work.
 
 ####