Pull request #1

asj · 2015-10-07T06:23:27Z

Kindly consider to pull in these changes. These patch were individually submitted to the mailing list before. Thanks.

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

…INTK defined error handling logic behaves differently with or without CONFIG_PRINTK defined, since there are two copies of the same function which a bit of different logic One, when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined, code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: save_error_info(fs_info); if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } and two when CONFIG_PRINTK is not defined, the code is __btrfs_std_error(..) { :: if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) { save_error_info(fs_info); btrfs_handle_error(fs_info); } } I doubt if this was intentional ? and appear to have caused since we maintain two copies of the same function and they got diverged with commits. Now to decide which logic is correct reviewed changes as below, 533574c Commit added two copies of this function cf79ffb Commit made change to only one copy of the function and to the copy when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined. To fix this, instead of maintaining two copies of same function approach, maintain single function, and just put the extra portion of the code under CONFIG_PRINTK define. This patch just does that. And keeps code of with CONFIG_PRINTK defined. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

btrfs_error() and btrfs_std_error() does the same thing and calls _btrfs_std_error(), so consolidate them together. And the main motivation is that btrfs_error() is closely named with btrfs_err(), one handles error action the other is to log the error, so don't closely name them. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Suggested-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

…ot found Use btrfs specific error code BTRFS_ERROR_DEV_MISSING_NOT_FOUND instead of -ENOENT. Next this removes the logging when user specifies "missing" and we don't find it in the kernel device list. Logging are for system events not for user input errors. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

This uses a chunk of code from btrfs_read_dev_super() and creates a function called btrfs_read_dev_one_super() so that next patch can use it for scratch superblock. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [renamed bufhead to bh] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

This patch updates and renames btrfs_scratch_superblocks, (which is used by the replace device thread), with those fixes from the scratch superblock code section of btrfs_rm_device(). The fixes are: Scratch all copies of superblock Notify kobject that superblock has been changed Update time on the device So that btrfs_rm_device() can use the function btrfs_scratch_superblocks() instead of its own scratch code. And further replace deivce code which similarly releases device back to the system, will have the fixes from the btrfs device delete. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [renamed to btrfs_scratch_superblock] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

By general rule of thumb there shouldn't be any way that user land could trigger a kernel operation just by sending wrong arguments. Here do commit cleanups after user input has been verified. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Originally the message was not in a helper but ended up there. We should print error messages from callers instead. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

To avoid deadlock described in commit 084b6e7 ("btrfs: Fix a lockdep warning when running xfstest."), we should move kobj stuff out of dev_replace lock range. "It is because the btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() will call memory allocation with GFP_KERNEL, which may flush fs page cache to free space, waiting for it self to do the commit, causing the deadlock. To solve the problem, move btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() out of the dev_replace lock range, also involing split the btrfs_rm_dev_replace_srcdev() function into remove and free parts. Now only btrfs_rm_dev_replace_remove_srcdev() is called in dev_replace lock range, and kobj_{add/rm} and btrfs_rm_dev_replace_free_srcdev() are called out of the lock range." Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [added lockup description] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

A part of code from btrfs_scan_one_device() is moved to a new function btrfs_read_disk_super(), so that former function looks cleaner and moves the code to ensure null terminating label to it as well. Further there is opportunity to merge various duplicate code on read disk super. Earlier attempt on this was highlighted that there was some issues for which there are multiple versions, however it was not clear what was issue. So until its worked out we can keep it in a separate function. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Optional Label may or may not be set, or it might be set at some time later. However while debugging to search through the kernel logs the scripts would need the logs to be consistent, so logs search key words shouldn't depend on the optional variables, instead fsid is better. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

This adds an enhancement to show the seed fsid and its devices on the btrfs sysfs. The way sprouting handles fs_devices: clone seed fs_devices and add to the fs_uuids mem copy seed fs_devices and assign to fs_devices->seed (move dev_list) evacuate seed fs_devices contents to hold sprout fs devices contents So to be inline with this fs_devices changes during seeding, represent seed fsid under the sprout fsid, this is achieved by using the kobject_move() The end result will be, /sys/fs/btrfs/sprout-fsid/seed/level-1-seed-fsid/seed/(if)level-2-seed-fsid Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

We need fsid kobject to hold pool attributes however its created only when fs is mounted. So, this patch changes the life cycle of the fsid and devices kobjects /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid> and /sys/fs/btrfs/<fsid>/devices, from created and destroyed by mount and unmount event to created and destroyed by scanned and module-unload events respectively. However this does not alter life cycle of fs attributes as such. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

move a section of btrfs_rm_device() code to check for min number of the devices into the function __check_raid_min_devices() v2: commit update and title renamed from Btrfs: move check for min number of devices to a function Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

The patch renames btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev() to btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() and moves it to volumes.c. so that delete device can use it. v2: changed title from 'Btrfs: create rename btrfs_dev_replace_find_srcdev()' and commit update Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

The operation of device replace and device delete follows same steps upto some depth with in btrfs kernel, however they don't share codes. This enhancement will help replace and delete to share codes. Btrfs: enhance check device_path in btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

This introduces new ioctl BTRFS_IOC_RM_DEV_V2, which uses enhanced struct btrfs_ioctl_vol_args_v2 to carry devid as an user argument. The patch won't delete the old ioctl interface and remains backward compatible with user land progs. Test case/script: echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) linear /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup create bad_disk mkfs.btrfs -f -d raid1 -m raid1 /dev/sdd /dev/sde /dev/mapper/bad_disk mount /dev/sdd /btrfs dmsetup suspend bad_disk echo "0 $(blockdev --getsz /dev/sdf) error /dev/sdf 0" | dmsetup load bad_disk dmsetup resume bad_disk echo "bad disk failed. now deleting/replacing" btrfs dev del 3 /btrfs echo $? btrfs fi show /btrfs umount /btrfs btrfs-show-super /dev/sdd | egrep num_device dmsetup remove bad_disk wipefs -a /dev/sdf Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reported-by: Martin <m_btrfs@ml1.co.uk>

btrfs_prelim_ref() calls the old and new reference variables in the incorrect order. This causes a NULL pointer dereference because oldref is passed as NULL to trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert(). Note, trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert() is being called with newref as oldref (and oldref as NULL) on purpose in order to print out the values of newref. To reproduce: echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/btrfs/btrfs_prelim_ref_insert/enable Perform some writeback operations. Backtrace: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 115949067 P4D 115949067 PUD 11594a067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1188 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-tester+ torvalds#47 PREEMPT(voluntary) 7ca2cef72d5e9c600f0c7718adb6462de8149622 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_btrfs__prelim_ref+0x72/0x130 Code: e8 43 81 9f ff 48 85 c0 74 78 4d 85 e4 0f 84 8f 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 0a 48 89 48 08 48 8b 52 08 48 89 50 10 <49> 8b 55 18 48 89 50 18 49 8b 55 20 48 89 50 20 41 0f b6 55 28 88 RSP: 0018:ffffce44820077a0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff8c6b403f9014 RBX: ffff8c6b55825730 RCX: 304994edf9cf506b RDX: d8b11eb7f0fdb699 RSI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RDI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8c6b4e8fb000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffce44820077a8 R15: ffff8c6b4abd1540 FS: 00007f4dc6813740(0000) GS:ffff8c6c1d378000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000010eb42000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prelim_ref_insert+0x1c1/0x270 find_parent_nodes+0x12a6/0x1ee0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f06/0x101f09 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0x167/0x640 ? fiemap_process_hole+0xd0/0x2c0 extent_fiemap+0xa5c/0xbc0 ? __entry_text_end+0x101f05/0x101f09 btrfs_fiemap+0x7e/0xd0 do_vfs_ioctl+0x425/0x9d0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x75/0xc0 Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv, instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from past the old_argv allocated memory. Following BUG_ON was hit: [ 3.038929][ T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040! [ 3.039147][ T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ... [ 3.056489][ T1] Call trace: [ 3.056591][ T1] __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P) [ 3.056773][ T1] dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210 [ 3.056942][ T1] dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360 [ 3.057132][ T1] table_load+0x110/0x3ac [ 3.057292][ T1] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c [ 3.057457][ T1] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec [ 3.057634][ T1] invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c [ 3.057804][ T1] el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc [ 3.057970][ T1] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 3.058123][ T1] el0_svc+0x50/0xac [ 3.058266][ T1] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4 [ 3.058452][ T1] el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4 [ 3.058620][ T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000) [ 3.058897][ T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 3.059083][ T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was. Fixes: 5a2a6c4 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>

If the discard worker is running and there's currently only one block group, that block group is a data block group, it's in the unused block groups discard list and is being used (it got an extent allocated from it after becoming unused), the worker can end up in an infinite loop if a transaction abort happens or the async discard is disabled (during remount or unmount for example). This happens like this: 1) Task A, the discard worker, is at peek_discard_list() and find_next_block_group() returns block group X; 2) Block group X is in the unused block groups discard list (its discard index is BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED) since at some point in the past it become an unused block group and was added to that list, but then later it got an extent allocated from it, so its ->used counter is not zero anymore; 3) The current transaction is aborted by task B and we end up at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() in the transaction abort path, where we call btrfs_discard_stop(), which clears BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING from fs_info, and then at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() we set the fs to RO mode (setting SB_RDONLY in the super block's s_flags field); 4) Task A calls __add_to_discard_list() with the goal of moving the block group from the unused block groups discard list into another discard list, but at __add_to_discard_list() we end up doing nothing because btrfs_run_discard_work() returns false, since the super block has SB_RDONLY set in its flags and BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING is not set anymore in fs_info->flags. So block group X remains in the unused block groups discard list; 5) Task A then does a goto into the 'again' label, calls find_next_block_group() again we gets block group X again. Then it repeats the previous steps over and over since there are not other block groups in the discard lists and block group X is never moved out of the unused block groups discard list since btrfs_run_discard_work() keeps returning false and therefore __add_to_discard_list() doesn't move block group X out of that discard list. When this happens we can get a soft lockup report like this: [71.957] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 27s! [kworker/u4:3:97] [71.957] Modules linked in: xfs af_packet rfkill (...) [71.957] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.957] Tainted: [W]=WARN [71.957] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.957] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.957] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [71.957] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [71.957] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [71.957] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [71.957] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [71.957] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [71.957] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [71.957] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [71.957] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89707bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [71.957] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [71.957] CR2: 00005605bcc8d2f0 CR3: 000000010376a001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [71.957] PKRU: 55555554 [71.957] Call Trace: [71.957] <TASK> [71.957] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [71.957] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [71.957] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] kthread+0xef/0x220 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [71.957] </TASK> [71.957] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [71.987] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W L 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.989] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP [71.989] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.991] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.992] Call Trace: [71.993] <IRQ> [71.994] dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x80 [71.994] panic+0x10b/0x2da [71.995] watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x9a/0xa1 [71.996] ? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 [71.997] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x132/0x2a0 [71.997] hrtimer_interrupt+0xff/0x230 [71.998] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x55/0x100 [71.999] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x90 [72.000] </IRQ> [72.000] <TASK> [72.001] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [72.002] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [72.002] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [72.005] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [72.006] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [72.006] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [72.007] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [72.008] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [72.009] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [72.010] ? btrfs_discard_workfn+0x51/0x400 [btrfs 23b01089228eb964071fb7ca156eee8cd3bf996f] [72.011] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [72.012] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [72.013] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [72.014] kthread+0xef/0x220 [72.014] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.015] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [72.015] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.016] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [72.017] </TASK> [72.017] Kernel Offset: 0x15000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [72.019] Rebooting in 90 seconds.. So fix this by making sure we move a block group out of the unused block groups discard list when calling __add_to_discard_list(). Fixes: 2bee7eb ("btrfs: discard one region at a time in async discard") Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1242012 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Calling core::fmt::write() from rust code while FineIBT is enabled results in a kernel panic: [ 4614.199779] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/cet.c:132! [ 4614.205343] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 4614.211781] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 6057 Comm: dmabuf_dump Tainted: G U O 6.12.17-android16-0-g6ab38c534a43 #1 9da040f27673ec3945e23b998a0f8bd64c846599 [ 4614.227832] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE [ 4614.241247] RIP: 0010:do_kernel_cp_fault+0xea/0xf0 ... [ 4614.398144] RIP: 0010:_RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x0/0x20 [ 4614.407792] Code: 48 f7 df 48 0f 48 f9 48 89 f2 89 c6 5d e9 18 fd ff ff 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 81 ea 14 61 af 2c 74 03 0f 0b 90 <66> 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 89 f2 48 8b 3f be 01 00 00 00 5d e9 e7 [ 4614.428775] RSP: 0018:ffffb95acfa4ba68 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 4614.434609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 4614.442587] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffb95acfa4ba70 RDI: ffffb95acfa4bc88 [ 4614.450557] RBP: ffffb95acfa4bae0 R08: ffff0a00ffffff05 R09: 0000000000000070 [ 4614.458527] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffab67eaf0 R12: ffffb95acfa4bcc8 [ 4614.466493] R13: ffffffffac5d50f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 4614.474473] ? __cfi__RNvXs5_NtNtNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt3num3impyNtB9_7Display3fmt+0x10/0x10 [ 4614.484118] ? _RNvNtCs3o2tGsuHyou_4core3fmt5write+0x1d2/0x250 This happens because core::fmt::write() calls core::fmt::rt::Argument::fmt(), which currently has CFI disabled: library/core/src/fmt/rt.rs: 171 // FIXME: Transmuting formatter in new and indirectly branching to/calling 172 // it here is an explicit CFI violation. 173 #[allow(inline_no_sanitize)] 174 #[no_sanitize(cfi, kcfi)] 175 #[inline] 176 pub(super) unsafe fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> Result { This causes a Control Protection exception, because FineIBT has sealed off the original function's endbr64. This makes rust currently incompatible with FineIBT. Add a Kconfig dependency that prevents FineIBT from getting turned on by default if rust is enabled. [ Rust 1.88.0 (scheduled for 2025-06-26) should have this fixed [1], and thus we relaxed the condition with Rust >= 1.88. When `objtool` lands checking for this with e.g. [2], the plan is to ideally run that in upstream Rust's CI to prevent regressions early [3], since we do not control `core`'s source code. Alice tested the Rust PR backported to an older compiler. Peter would like that Rust provides a stable `core` which can be pulled into the kernel: "Relying on that much out of tree code is 'unfortunate'". - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Paweł Anikiel <panikiel@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/rust-for-linux/20250410154556.GB9003@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/ [2] Link: rust-lang/rust#139632 (comment) [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410115420.366349-1-panikiel@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/att0-CANiq72kjDM0cKALVy4POEzhfdT4nO7tqz0Pm7xM+3=_0+L1t=A@mail.gmail.com [ Reduced splat. - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>

…cess Add __netif_tx_lock() to ensure that only one packet is being transmitted at a time to avoid race conditions in the netif_txq struct and prevent packet data corruption. Failing to do so causes kernel panic with the following error: [ 2184.746764] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2184.751412] kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! [ 2184.756728] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP logs: https://gist.github.com/MeghanaMalladiTI/9c7aa5fc3b7fb03f87c74aad487956e9 The lock is acquired before calling emac_xmit_xdp_frame() and released after the call returns. This ensures that the TX queue is protected from concurrent access during the transmission of XDP frames. Fixes: 62aa324 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Add XDP support") Signed-off-by: Meghana Malladi <m-malladi@ti.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506110546.4065715-3-m-malladi@ti.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When userspace does PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, but Supm extension is not available, the kernel crashes: Oops - illegal instruction [#1] [snip] epc : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a ra : set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x74/0x15a epc : ffffffff80011ace ra : ffffffff80011a30 sp : ffffffc60039be10 [snip] status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000010a79073 cause: 0000000000000002 set_tagged_addr_ctrl+0x112/0x15a __riscv_sys_prctl+0x352/0x73c do_trap_ecall_u+0x17c/0x20c andle_exception+0x150/0x15c Fix it by checking if Supm is available. Fixes: 09d6775 ("riscv: Add support for userspace pointer masking") Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250504101920.3393053-1-namcao@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.15, take #1 - Add missing reset of smstateen CSRs

If the discard worker is running and there's currently only one block group, that block group is a data block group, it's in the unused block groups discard list and is being used (it got an extent allocated from it after becoming unused), the worker can end up in an infinite loop if a transaction abort happens or the async discard is disabled (during remount or unmount for example). This happens like this: 1) Task A, the discard worker, is at peek_discard_list() and find_next_block_group() returns block group X; 2) Block group X is in the unused block groups discard list (its discard index is BTRFS_DISCARD_INDEX_UNUSED) since at some point in the past it become an unused block group and was added to that list, but then later it got an extent allocated from it, so its ->used counter is not zero anymore; 3) The current transaction is aborted by task B and we end up at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() in the transaction abort path, where we call btrfs_discard_stop(), which clears BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING from fs_info, and then at __btrfs_handle_fs_error() we set the fs to RO mode (setting SB_RDONLY in the super block's s_flags field); 4) Task A calls __add_to_discard_list() with the goal of moving the block group from the unused block groups discard list into another discard list, but at __add_to_discard_list() we end up doing nothing because btrfs_run_discard_work() returns false, since the super block has SB_RDONLY set in its flags and BTRFS_FS_DISCARD_RUNNING is not set anymore in fs_info->flags. So block group X remains in the unused block groups discard list; 5) Task A then does a goto into the 'again' label, calls find_next_block_group() again we gets block group X again. Then it repeats the previous steps over and over since there are not other block groups in the discard lists and block group X is never moved out of the unused block groups discard list since btrfs_run_discard_work() keeps returning false and therefore __add_to_discard_list() doesn't move block group X out of that discard list. When this happens we can get a soft lockup report like this: [71.957] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 27s! [kworker/u4:3:97] [71.957] Modules linked in: xfs af_packet rfkill (...) [71.957] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.957] Tainted: [W]=WARN [71.957] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.957] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.957] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [71.957] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [71.957] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [71.957] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [71.957] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [71.957] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [71.957] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [71.957] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [71.957] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89707bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [71.957] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [71.957] CR2: 00005605bcc8d2f0 CR3: 000000010376a001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [71.957] PKRU: 55555554 [71.957] Call Trace: [71.957] <TASK> [71.957] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [71.957] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [71.957] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] kthread+0xef/0x220 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [71.957] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [71.957] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [71.957] </TASK> [71.957] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks [71.987] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 97 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G W L 6.14.2-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 968795ef2b1407352128b466fe887416c33af6fa [71.989] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP [71.989] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [71.991] Workqueue: btrfs_discard btrfs_discard_workfn [btrfs] [71.992] Call Trace: [71.993] <IRQ> [71.994] dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x80 [71.994] panic+0x10b/0x2da [71.995] watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x9a/0xa1 [71.996] ? __pfx_watchdog_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 [71.997] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x132/0x2a0 [71.997] hrtimer_interrupt+0xff/0x230 [71.998] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x55/0x100 [71.999] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x90 [72.000] </IRQ> [72.000] <TASK> [72.001] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [72.002] RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_workfn+0xc4/0x400 [btrfs] [72.002] Code: c1 01 48 83 (...) [72.005] RSP: 0018:ffffafaec03efe08 EFLAGS: 00000246 [72.006] RAX: ffff897045500000 RBX: ffff8970413ed8d0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [72.006] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8970413ed8d0 RDI: 0000000a8f1272ad [72.007] RBP: 0000000a9d61c60e R08: ffff897045500140 R09: 8080808080808080 [72.008] R10: ffff897040276800 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: ffff8970413ed860 [72.009] R13: ffff897045500000 R14: ffff8970413ed868 R15: 0000000000000000 [72.010] ? btrfs_discard_workfn+0x51/0x400 [btrfs 23b01089228eb964071fb7ca156eee8cd3bf996f] [72.011] process_one_work+0x17e/0x330 [72.012] worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 [72.013] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [72.014] kthread+0xef/0x220 [72.014] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.015] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [72.015] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [72.016] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [72.017] </TASK> [72.017] Kernel Offset: 0x15000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [72.019] Rebooting in 90 seconds.. So fix this by making sure we move a block group out of the unused block groups discard list when calling __add_to_discard_list(). Fixes: 2bee7eb ("btrfs: discard one region at a time in async discard") Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1242012 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

When CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST is enabled, fprobe triggers the following warning: WARNING: suspicious RCU usage kernel/trace/fprobe.c:457 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: #1: ffffffff863c4e08 (fprobe_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fprobe_module_callback+0x7b/0x8c0 Call Trace: fprobe_module_callback notifier_call_chain blocking_notifier_call_chain This warning occurs because fprobe_remove_node_in_module() traverses an RCU list using RCU primitives without holding an RCU read lock. However, the function is only called from fprobe_module_callback(), which holds the fprobe_mutex lock that provides sufficient protection for safely traversing the list. Fix the warning by specifying the locking design to the CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST mechanism. Add the lockdep_is_held() argument to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() to inform the RCU checker that fprobe_mutex provides the required protection. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250410-fprobe-v1-1-068ef5f41436@debian.org/ Fixes: a3dc298 ("tracing: fprobe: Cleanup fprobe hash when module unloading") Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Tested-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@mandelbit.com> Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>

MACsec offload is not supported in switchdev mode for uplink representors. When switching to the uplink representor profile, the MACsec offload feature must be cleared from the netdevice's features. If left enabled, attempts to add offloads result in a null pointer dereference, as the uplink representor does not support MACsec offload even though the feature bit remains set. Clear NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC in mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features(). Kernel log: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 4714 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_02_17_35 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 Code: d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ad 15 00 00 8b 35 91 5c fe 03 85 f6 75 29 49 8d 7e 60 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a6 15 00 00 4d 3b 76 60 0f 85 fd 0b 00 00 65 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888147a4f160 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000078 RBP: ffff888147a4f2e0 R08: ffffffffa05d2c19 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff888152de0000 FS: 00007f855e27d800(0000) GS:ffff88881ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004e5768 CR3: 000000013ae7c005 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? __mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1ae0/0x1ae0 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? macsec_upd_offload+0x145/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x249/0x6b0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0xb5/0x240 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsa+0x11a0/0x11a0 [mlx5_core] macsec_update_offload+0x26c/0x820 ? macsec_set_mac_address+0x4b0/0x4b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 macsec_upd_offload+0x2c8/0x380 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x30 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x15e/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240 ? cap_capable+0xd4/0x330 genl_rcv_msg+0x3ea/0x670 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12b/0x390 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? netlink_ack+0xd80/0xd80 ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0xf90/0xf90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xac0 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x155/0xac0 ? _copy_from_iter+0x1bb/0x12c0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x440/0x700 ? netlink_attachskb+0x760/0x760 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 netlink_sendmsg+0x749/0xc10 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53f/0x760 ? import_iovec+0x7/0x10 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 ? __copy_msghdr+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x90/0x90 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x28/0xa30 ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x110/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x116/0x3b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1da/0x3b0 ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 ? __delete_object+0x21/0x50 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 ? kmem_cache_free+0x14c/0x4e0 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f855e113367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd15e90c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f855e113367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd15e90cf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd15e90dbc R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 000000000045d100 R10: 00007f855e011dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000019 R13: 0000000067c6b785 R14: 00000000004a1e80 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_dpll mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 8ff0ac5 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1746958552-561295-1-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

…unload Kernel panic occurs when a devmem TCP socket is closed after NIC module is unloaded. This is Devmem TCP unregistration scenarios. number is an order. (a)netlink socket close (b)pp destroy (c)uninstall result 1 2 3 OK 1 3 2 (d)Impossible 2 1 3 OK 3 1 2 (e)Kernel panic 2 3 1 (d)Impossible 3 2 1 (d)Impossible (a) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() is called when devmem TCP socket is closed. (b) page_pool_destroy() is called when the interface is down. (c) mp_ops->uninstall() is called when an interface is unregistered. (d) There is no scenario in mp_ops->uninstall() is called before page_pool_destroy(). Because unregister_netdevice_many_notify() closes interfaces first and then calls mp_ops->uninstall(). (e) netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() accesses struct net_device to acquire netdev_lock(). But if the interface module has already been removed, net_device pointer is invalid, so it causes kernel panic. In summary, there are only 3 possible scenarios. A. sk close -> pp destroy -> uninstall. B. pp destroy -> sk close -> uninstall. C. pp destroy -> uninstall -> sk close. Case C is a kernel panic scenario. In order to fix this problem, It makes mp_dmabuf_devmem_uninstall() set binding->dev to NULL. It indicates an bound net_device was unregistered. It makes netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy() do not acquire netdev_lock() if binding->dev is NULL. A new binding->lock is added to protect a dev of a binding. So, lock ordering is like below. priv->lock netdev_lock(dev) binding->lock Tests: Scenario A: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 kill $pid ip link set $interface down modprobe -rv $module Scenario B: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 ip link set $interface down kill $pid modprobe -rv $module Scenario C: ./ncdevmem -s 192.168.1.4 -c 192.168.1.2 -f $interface -l -p 8000 \ -v 7 -t 1 -q 1 & pid=$! sleep 10 modprobe -rv $module sleep 5 kill $pid Splat looks like: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc001fffa9f7: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00000000fffd4fb8-0x00000000fffd4fbf] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2041 Comm: ncdevmem Tainted: G B W 6.15.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(undef) 0947ec89efa0fd68838b78e36aa1617e97ff5d7f Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock (./include/linux/sched.h:2244 kernel/locking/mutex.c:400 kernel/locking/mutex.c:443 kernel/locking/mutex.c:605 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746) Code: ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 13 00 00 49 8b 1e 48 83 e3 f8 74 6a 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 34 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 f RSP: 0018:ffff88826f7ef730 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000fffd4f88 RCX: ffffffffaa9bc811 RDX: 000000001fffa9f7 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000fffd4fbc RBP: ffff88826f7ef8b0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed103e6aa1a4 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff88826f7ef442 R12: fffffbfff669f65e R13: ffff88812a830040 R14: ffff8881f3550d20 R15: 00000000fffd4f88 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888866c05000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000563bed0cb288 CR3: 00000001a7c98000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ... netdev_nl_sock_priv_destroy (net/core/netdev-genl.c:953 (discriminator 3)) genl_release (net/netlink/genetlink.c:653 net/netlink/genetlink.c:694 net/netlink/genetlink.c:705) ... netlink_release (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:737) ... __sock_release (net/socket.c:647) sock_close (net/socket.c:1393) Fixes: 1d22d30 ("net: drop rtnl_lock for queue_mgmt operations") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514154028.1062909-1-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Currently iwdev->rf is allocated in irdma_probe(), but free in irdma_ib_dealloc_device(). It can be misleading. Move the free to irdma_remove() to be more obvious. Freeing in irdma_ib_dealloc_device() leads to KASAN use-after-free issue. Which can also lead to NULL pointer dereference. Fix this. irdma_deinit_interrupts() can't be moved before freeing iwdef->rf, because in this case deinit interrupts will be done before freeing irqs. The simplest solution is to move kfree(iwdev->rf) to irdma_remove(). Reproducer: sudo rmmod irdma Minified splat(s): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? kfree+0x253/0x450 ? irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma] kasan_report+0xed/0x120 ? irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma] irdma_remove+0x257/0x2d0 [irdma] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x56/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x530 ? kernfs_put.part.0+0x147/0x310 driver_detach+0xbf/0x180 bus_remove_driver+0x11b/0x2a0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x1a/0x50 irdma_exit_module+0x40/0x4c [irdma] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:ice_free_rdma_qvector+0x2a/0xa0 [ice] Call Trace: ? ice_free_rdma_qvector+0x2a/0xa0 [ice] irdma_remove+0x179/0x2d0 [irdma] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x56/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x371/0x530 ? kobject_put+0x61/0x4b0 driver_detach+0xbf/0x180 bus_remove_driver+0x11b/0x2a0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x1a/0x50 irdma_exit_module+0x40/0x4c [irdma] Reported-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8e533834-4564-472f-b29b-4f1cb7730053@linux.intel.com/ Fixes: 3e0d3cb ("ice, irdma: move interrupts code to irdma") Reviewed-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tatyana Nikolova <tatyana.e.nikolova@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250414234231.523-1-tatyana.e.nikolova@intel.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>

When memory is insufficient, the allocation of nfs_lock_context in nfs_get_lock_context() fails and returns -ENOMEM. If we mistakenly treat an nfs4_unlockdata structure (whose l_ctx member has been set to -ENOMEM) as valid and proceed to execute rpc_run_task(), this will trigger a NULL pointer dereference in nfs4_locku_prepare. For example: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u64:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-dirty torvalds#60 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule RIP: 0010:nfs4_locku_prepare+0x35/0xc2 Code: 89 f2 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 68 69 ef b5 53 48 8b 8e 90 00 00 00 48 89 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffbbafc006bdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000004b RBX: ffff9b964fc1fa00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: fffffffffffffff4 RDI: ffff9ba53fddbf40 RBP: ffff9ba539934000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbbafc006bc38 R10: ffffffffb6b689c8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9ba539934030 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000004248060 R15: ffffffffb56d1c30 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ba5881f0000(0000) knlGS:00000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000093f244000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __rpc_execute+0xbc/0x480 rpc_async_schedule+0x2f/0x40 process_one_work+0x232/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x1da/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x10d/0x240 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 000000000000000c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Free the allocated nfs4_unlockdata when nfs_get_lock_context() fails and return NULL to terminate subsequent rpc_run_task, preventing NULL pointer dereference. Fixes: f30cb75 ("NFS: Always wait for I/O completion before unlock") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417072508.3850532-1-lilingfeng3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

Guoyu Yin reported a splat in the ipmr netns cleanup path: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14564 at net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 14564 Comm: syz.4.838 Not tainted 6.14.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ipmr_free_table net/ipv4/ipmr.c:440 [inline] RIP: 0010:ipmr_rules_exit+0x135/0x1c0 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:361 Code: ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 7d 48 c7 83 60 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 71 67 7f 00 e8 4c 2d 8a fd 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 93 e8 41 2d 8a fd 0f b6 2d 80 54 ea 01 31 ff 89 ee e8 RSP: 0018:ffff888109547c58 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888108c12dc0 RCX: ffffffff83e09868 RDX: ffff8881022b3300 RSI: ffffffff83e098d4 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff888104288000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed10211825c9 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff88801816c4a0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff888108c13320 R14: ffff888108c12dc0 R15: fffffbfff0b74058 FS: 00007f84f39316c0(0000) GS:ffff88811b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f84f3930f98 CR3: 0000000113b56000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ipmr_net_exit_batch+0x50/0x90 net/ipv4/ipmr.c:3160 ops_exit_list+0x10c/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:177 setup_net+0x47d/0x8e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:394 copy_net_ns+0x25d/0x410 net/core/net_namespace.c:516 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xaf0 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:228 ksys_unshare+0x78d/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:3342 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3411 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3411 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f84f532cc29 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f84f3931038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f84f5615fa0 RCX: 00007f84f532cc29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000400 RBP: 00007f84f53fba18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f84f5615fa0 R15: 00007fff51c5f328 </TASK> The running kernel has CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES disabled, and the sanity check for such build is still too loose. Address the issue consolidating the relevant sanity check in a single helper regardless of the kernel configuration. Also share it between the ipv4 and ipv6 code. Reported-by: Guoyu Yin <y04609127@gmail.com> Fixes: 50b9420 ("ipmr: tune the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/372dc261e1bf12742276e1b984fc5a071b7fc5a8.1747321903.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

When performing a right split on a folio, the split_at2 may point to a not-present page if the offset + length equals the original folio size, which will trigger the following error: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea0006000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 143ffb9067 P4D 143ffb9067 PUD 143ffb8067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 502640 Comm: fsx Not tainted 6.15.0-rc3-gc6156189fc6b torvalds#889 PR Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/4 RIP: 0010:truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x208/0x620 Code: ff 03 48 01 da e8 78 7e 13 00 48 83 05 10 b5 5a 0c 01 85 c0 0f 85 1c 02 001 RSP: 0018:ffffc90005bafab0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0005ffff00 RCX: 0000000000000002 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 0000000000013975 RDI: ffffc90005bafa30 RBP: ffffea0006000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000009bf R10: 00000000000007e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001633 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffea0005ffff00 R15: fffffffffffffffe FS: 00007f9f9a161740(0000) GS:ffff8894971fd000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffea0006000008 CR3: 000000017c2ae000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> truncate_inode_pages_range+0x226/0x720 truncate_pagecache+0x57/0x90 ... Fix this issue by skipping the split if truncation aligns with the folio size, make sure the split page number lies within the folio. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250512062825.3533342-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com Fixes: 7460b47 ("mm/truncate: use folio_split() in truncate operation") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Cc: ErKun Yang <yangerkun@huawei.com> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

…ugetlb folios A kernel crash was observed when replacing free hugetlb folios: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 29639 Comm: test_cma.sh Tainted 6.15.0-rc6-zp torvalds#41 PREEMPT(voluntary) RIP: 0010:alloc_and_dissolve_hugetlb_folio+0x1d/0x1f0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b30fa90 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000342cca RCX: ffffea0043000000 RDX: ffffc9000b30fb08 RSI: ffffea0043000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000b30fb20 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88886f92eb00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0043000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000010c0200 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fcda5f14740(0000) GS:ffff8888ec1d8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000391402000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> replace_free_hugepage_folios+0xb6/0x100 alloc_contig_range_noprof+0x18a/0x590 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? down_read+0x12/0xa0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f cma_range_alloc.constprop.0+0x131/0x290 __cma_alloc+0xcf/0x2c0 cma_alloc_write+0x43/0xb0 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb2/0x110 debugfs_attr_write+0x46/0x70 full_proxy_write+0x62/0xa0 vfs_write+0xf8/0x420 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? filp_flush+0x86/0xa0 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? filp_close+0x1f/0x30 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? do_dup2+0xaf/0x160 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ksys_write+0x65/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e There is a potential race between __update_and_free_hugetlb_folio() and replace_free_hugepage_folios(): CPU1 CPU2 __update_and_free_hugetlb_folio replace_free_hugepage_folios folio_test_hugetlb(folio) -- It's still hugetlb folio. __folio_clear_hugetlb(folio) hugetlb_free_folio(folio) h = folio_hstate(folio) -- Here, h is NULL pointer When the above race condition occurs, folio_hstate(folio) returns NULL, and subsequent access to this NULL pointer will cause the system to crash. To resolve this issue, execute folio_hstate(folio) under the protection of the hugetlb_lock lock, ensuring that folio_hstate(folio) does not return NULL. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1747884137-26685-1-git-send-email-yangge1116@126.com Fixes: 04f13d2 ("mm: replace free hugepage folios after migration") Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116@126.com> Reviewed-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Barry Song <21cnbao@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

…_USERCOPY=y crash Borislav Petkov reported the following boot crash on x86-32, with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y: | usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object 'task_struct' (offset 2112, size 160)! | ... | kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! So the useroffset and usersize arguments are what control the allowed window of copying in/out of the "task_struct" kmem cache: /* create a slab on which task_structs can be allocated */ task_struct_whitelist(&useroffset, &usersize); task_struct_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("task_struct", arch_task_struct_size, align, SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, useroffset, usersize, NULL); task_struct_whitelist() positions this window based on the location of the thread_struct within task_struct, and gets the arch-specific details via arch_thread_struct_whitelist(offset, size): static void __init task_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { /* Fetch thread_struct whitelist for the architecture. */ arch_thread_struct_whitelist(offset, size); /* * Handle zero-sized whitelist or empty thread_struct, otherwise * adjust offset to position of thread_struct in task_struct. */ if (unlikely(*size == 0)) *offset = 0; else *offset += offsetof(struct task_struct, thread); } Commit cb7ca40 ("x86/fpu: Make task_struct::thread constant size") removed the logic for the window, leaving: static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { *offset = 0; *size = 0; } So now there is no window that usercopy hardening will allow to be copied in/out of task_struct. But as reported above, there *is* a copy in copy_uabi_to_xstate(). (It seems there are several, actually.) int copy_sigframe_from_user_to_xstate(struct task_struct *tsk, const void __user *ubuf) { return copy_uabi_to_xstate(x86_task_fpu(tsk)->fpstate, NULL, ubuf, &tsk->thread.pkru); } This appears to be writing into x86_task_fpu(tsk)->fpstate. With or without CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU, this resolves to: ((struct fpu *)((void *)(task) + sizeof(*(task)))) i.e. the memory "after task_struct" is cast to "struct fpu", and the uses the "fpstate" pointer. How that pointer gets set looks to be variable, but I think the one we care about here is: fpu->fpstate = &fpu->__fpstate; And struct fpu::__fpstate says: struct fpstate __fpstate; /* * WARNING: '__fpstate' is dynamically-sized. Do not put * anything after it here. */ So we're still dealing with a dynamically sized thing, even if it's not within the literal struct task_struct -- it's still in the kmem cache, though. Looking at the kmem cache size, it has allocated "arch_task_struct_size" bytes, which is calculated in fpu__init_task_struct_size(): int task_size = sizeof(struct task_struct); task_size += sizeof(struct fpu); /* * Subtract off the static size of the register state. * It potentially has a bunch of padding. */ task_size -= sizeof(union fpregs_state); /* * Add back the dynamically-calculated register state * size. */ task_size += fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size; /* * We dynamically size 'struct fpu', so we require that * 'state' be at the end of 'it: */ CHECK_MEMBER_AT_END_OF(struct fpu, __fpstate); arch_task_struct_size = task_size; So, this is still copying out of the kmem cache for task_struct, and the window seems unchanged (still fpu regs). This is what the window was before: void fpu_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, unsigned long *size) { *offset = offsetof(struct thread_struct, fpu.__fpstate.regs); *size = fpu_kernel_cfg.default_size; } And the same commit I mentioned above removed it. I think the misunderstanding is here: | The fpu_thread_struct_whitelist() quirk to hardened usercopy can be removed, | now that the FPU structure is not embedded in the task struct anymore, which | reduces text footprint a bit. Yes, FPU is no longer in task_struct, but it IS in the kmem cache named "task_struct", since the fpstate is still being allocated there. Partially revert the earlier mentioned commit, along with a recalculation of the fpstate regs location. Fixes: cb7ca40 ("x86/fpu: Make task_struct::thread constant size") Reported-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250409211127.3544993-1-mingo@kernel.org/ # Discussion #1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202505041418.F47130C4C8@keescook # Discussion #2

Move hctx debugfs/sysfs register out of freezing queue in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(), so that the following lockdep dependency can be killed: #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)torvalds#16){++++}-{0:0}: #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: //debugfs And registering/un-registering hctx debugfs/sysfs does not require queue to be frozen: - hctx sysfs attributes show() are drained when removing kobject, and there isn't store() implementation for hctx sysfs attributes - debugfs entry read() is drained too when removing debugfs directory, and there isn't write() implementation for hctx debugfs too - so it is safe to register/unregister hctx sysfs/debugfs without freezing queue because the cod paths changes nothing, and we just need to keep hctx live Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-23-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

…xit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-26-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> says: This adds a test for fanotify mount ns notifications inside userns [1]. While working on the test I ended up making lots of cleanups to reduce build dependency on make headers_install. These patches got rid of the dependency for my kvm setup for the affected filesystems tests. Building with TOOLS_INCLUDES dir was recommended by John Hubbard [2]. NOTE #1: these patches are based on a merge of vfs-6.16.mount (changes wrappers.h) into v6.15-rc5 (changes mount-notify_test.c), so if this cleanup is acceptable, we should probably setup a selftests branch for 6.16, so that it can be used to test the fanotify patches. NOTE #2: some of the defines in wrappers.h are left for overlayfs and mount_setattr tests, which were not converted to use TOOLS_INCLUDES. I did not want to mess with those tests. * patches from https://lore.kernel.org/20250509133240.529330-1-amir73il@gmail.com: selftests/fs/mount-notify: add a test variant running inside userns selftests/filesystems: create setup_userns() helper selftests/filesystems: create get_unique_mnt_id() helper selftests/fs/mount-notify: build with tools include dir selftests/mount_settattr: remove duplicate syscall definitions selftests/pidfd: move syscall definitions into wrappers.h selftests/fs/statmount: build with tools include dir selftests/filesystems: move wrapper.h out of overlayfs subdir Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250509133240.529330-1-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

When calling the diag for DCSS unload on a non-IPL CPU, the sclp maximum memory detection on the next IPL would falsely return the end of the previously loaded DCSS. This is because of an issue in z/VM, so work around it by always calling the diag for DCSS unload on IPL CPU 0. That CPU cannot be set offline, so the dcss_diag() call can directly be scheduled to CPU 0. The wrong maximum memory value returned by sclp would only affect KASAN kernels. When a DCSS within the falsely reported extra memory range is loaded and accessed again, it would result in a kernel crash: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 001c0000a3ffe000 TEID: 001c0000a3ffe803 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:000000039955400b R2:00000003fe3b400b R3:000000037a2a8007 S:0000000000000020 Oops: 0010 ilc:3 [#1]SMP [...] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1563 Comm: mount Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5-11546-g3ea93fb3d026-dirty #7 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (z/VM 7.4.0) Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000da6f2b338faf2 (kasan_check_range+0x172/0x310) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000040 001c0000a3ffe000 000000051fff0000 0000000000001000 0000000000000000 000da6f233380ff6 00000000000001f8 0000000000000000 001c0000a3ffe200 0000000000000040 001c0000a3ffe200 0000000000000200 000003ff97a2cfa8 0000000000000000 0000000000000010 000da672b58af070 Krnl Code: 000da6f2b338fae2: 41101008 la %r1,8(%r1) 000da6f2b338fae6: eca100268064 cgrj %r10,%r1,8,000da6f2b338fb32 #000da6f2b338faec: ebe00002000c srlg %r14,%r0,2 >000da6f2b338faf2: e3b010000002 ltg %r11,0(%r1) 000da6f2b338faf8: a77400a8 brc 7,000da6f2b338fc48 000da6f2b338fafc: 41b01008 la %r11,8(%r1) 000da6f2b338fb00: b904001b lgr %r1,%r11 000da6f2b338fb04: e3a0b0000002 ltg %r10,0(%r11) Call Trace: [<000da6f2b338faf2>] kasan_check_range+0x172/0x310 [<000da6f2b3390b3c>] __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x90 [<000da6f233380ff6>] dcssblk_submit_bio+0x3a6/0x620 [dcssblk] [<000da6f2b3eb403c>] __submit_bio+0x25c/0x4a0 [<000da6f2b3eb43bc>] __submit_bio_noacct+0x13c/0x450 [<000da6f2b3eb4bde>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x50e/0x620 [<000da6f2b34f4978>] mpage_readahead+0x318/0x3f0 [<000da6f2b31edbe6>] read_pages+0x156/0x740 [<000da6f2b31ee594>] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x3c4/0x610 [<000da6f2b31ef094>] force_page_cache_ra+0x1f4/0x2d0 [<000da6f2b31d092e>] filemap_get_pages+0x2ce/0xaa0 [<000da6f2b31d1428>] filemap_read+0x328/0x9a0 [<000da6f2b3e9b7e8>] blkdev_read_iter+0x228/0x3b0 [<000da6f2b340f7a6>] vfs_read+0x5b6/0x7f0 [<000da6f2b34110be>] ksys_read+0x10e/0x1e0 [<000da6f2b4e7acb2>] __do_syscall+0x122/0x1f0 [<000da6f2b4e93ffe>] system_call+0x6e/0x90 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000da6f2b338faac>] kasan_check_range+0x12c/0x310 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>

__run_io_and_remove() is used in several stress tests for running heavy IO vs. removing device meantime. However, sequential `readwrite` is taken in the fio script, which isn't correct, we should take random IO for saturating ublk device. Also turns out '--num_jobs=4' isn't stressful enough, so change it to '--num_jobs=$(nproc)'. Finally we don't cover single queue test in `test_stress_02.sh`, so add single queue test which can trigger request tag recycling easier. With above change the issue in #1 can be reproduced reliably in stress_02.sh. Link:https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/mruqwpf4tqenkbtgezv5oxwq7ngyq24jzeyqy4ixzvivatbbxv@4oh2wzz4e6qn/ #1 Cc: Jared Holzman <jholzman@nvidia.com> Cc: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250519031620.245749-1-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

If the test added in commit b5ffbd1 ("sysctl: move the extra1/2 boundary check of u8 to sysctl_check_table_array") is run as a module, a lingering reference to the module is left behind, and a 'sysctl -a' leads to a panic. To reproduce CONFIG_KUNIT=y CONFIG_SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST=m Then run these commands: modprobe sysctl-test rmmod sysctl-test sysctl -a The panic varies but generally looks something like this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa4571c0c7db4 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100351067 PMD 114f5e067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI ... ... ... RIP: 0010:proc_sys_readdir+0x166/0x2c0 ... ... ... Call Trace: <TASK> iterate_dir+0x6e/0x140 __se_sys_getdents+0x6e/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x70/0x150 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Move the test to lib/test_sysctl.c where the registration reference is handled on module exit Fixes: b5ffbd1 ("sysctl: move the extra1/2 boundary check of u8 to sysctl_check_table_array") Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>

ETDM2_IN_BE and ETDM1_OUT_BE are defined as COMP_EMPTY(), in the case the codec dai_name will be null. Avoid a crash if the device tree is not assigning a codec to these links. [ 1.179936] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 1.181065] Mem abort info: [ 1.181420] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 1.181892] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1.182576] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1.182964] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1.183367] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1.183983] Data abort info: [ 1.184406] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 1.185097] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 1.185766] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 1.186439] [0000000000000000] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 1.187239] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1.188029] Modules linked in: [ 1.188420] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 70 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4-next-20250226+ torvalds#85 [ 1.189515] Hardware name: Radxa NIO 12L (DT) [ 1.190065] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.190808] pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1.191683] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140 [ 1.192170] lr : mt8195_mt6359_soc_card_probe+0x224/0x7b0 [ 1.192854] sp : ffff800083473970 [ 1.193271] x29: ffff800083473a10 x28: 0000000000001008 x27: 0000000000000002 [ 1.194168] x26: ffff800082408960 x25: ffff800082417db0 x24: ffff800082417d88 [ 1.195065] x23: 000000000000001e x22: ffff800082dbf480 x21: ffff800082dc07b8 [ 1.195961] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000013 x18: 00000000ffffffff [ 1.196858] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000006 [ 1.197755] x14: ffff800082407af0 x13: 6e6f69737265766e x12: 692d6b636f6c6374 [ 1.198651] x11: 0000000000000002 x10: ffff80008240b920 x9 : 0000000000000018 [ 1.199547] x8 : 0101010101010101 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.200443] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080808080000000 x3 : 303933383978616d [ 1.201339] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff80008240b920 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 1.202236] Call trace: [ 1.202545] __pi_strcmp+0x24/0x140 (P) [ 1.203029] mtk_soundcard_common_probe+0x3bc/0x5b8 [ 1.203644] platform_probe+0x70/0xe8 [ 1.204106] really_probe+0xc8/0x3a0 [ 1.204556] __driver_probe_device+0x84/0x160 [ 1.205104] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x130 [ 1.205630] __device_attach_driver+0xc4/0x170 [ 1.206189] bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xf8 [ 1.206672] __device_attach+0xa8/0x1c8 [ 1.207155] device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x30 [ 1.207681] bus_probe_device+0xb0/0xc0 [ 1.208165] deferred_probe_work_func+0xa4/0x100 [ 1.208747] process_one_work+0x158/0x3e0 [ 1.209254] worker_thread+0x2c4/0x3e8 [ 1.209727] kthread+0x134/0x1f0 [ 1.210136] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 1.210589] Code: 5400040 b50002c6 d503201f f86a6803 (f8408402) [ 1.211355] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Julien Massot <julien.massot@collabora.com> Fixes: e70b8dd ("ASoC: mediatek: mt8195: Remove afe-dai component and rework codec link") Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250417-mt8395-audio-sof-v1-2-30587426e5dd@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

Using a DSQ iterators from a timer callback can trigger the following lockdep splat when accessing scx_root: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.14.0-virtme #1 Not tainted ----------------------------- kernel/sched/ext.c:6907 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by swapper/0/0. stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.14.0-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full) Sched_ext: tickless (enabled+all) Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0xa3 bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new+0xb1/0xd0 bpf_prog_63f4fd1bccc101e7_dispatch_cpu+0x3e/0x156 bpf_prog_8320d4217989178c_dispatch_all_cpus+0x153/0x1b6 bpf_prog_97f847d871513f95_sched_timerfn+0x4c/0x264 ? hrtimer_run_softirq+0x4f/0xd0 bpf_timer_cb+0x7a/0x140 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1f9/0x3a0 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x8c/0xd0 handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x3d0 __irq_exit_rcu+0x9a/0xc0 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x73/0x80 Add a proper dereference check to explicitly validate RCU-safe access to scx_root from rcu_read_lock() contexts and also from contexts that hold rcu_read_lock_bh(), such as timer callbacks. Fixes: cdf5a6f ("sched_ext: Move dsq_hash into scx_sched") Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

A sched_ext scheduler may trigger __scx_exit() from a BPF timer callback, where scx_root may not be safely dereferenced. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference as shown below (triggered by scx_tickless): BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000330 ... CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.14.0-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:__scx_exit+0x2b/0x190 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> scx_bpf_get_idle_smtmask+0x59/0x80 bpf_prog_8320d4217989178c_dispatch_all_cpus+0x35/0x1b6 ... bpf_prog_97f847d871513f95_sched_timerfn+0x4c/0x264 bpf_timer_cb+0x7a/0x140 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1f9/0x3a0 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x8c/0xd0 handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x3d0 __irq_exit_rcu+0x9a/0xc0 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 Fix this by checking for a valid scx_root and adding proper RCU protection. Fixes: 48e1267 ("sched_ext: Introduce scx_sched") Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f torvalds#11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf torvalds#12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 torvalds#13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 torvalds#14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d torvalds#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e torvalds#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad torvalds#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e torvalds#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 torvalds#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 torvalds#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 torvalds#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 torvalds#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 torvalds#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 torvalds#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 torvalds#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc torvalds#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 torvalds#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 torvalds#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 torvalds#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d torvalds#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 torvalds#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 torvalds#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 torvalds#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d torvalds#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 torvalds#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e torvalds#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 torvalds#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 torvalds#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 torvalds#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 torvalds#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 torvalds#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency [1] when cpu_hotplug_lock is acquired inside store_local_boost(), after policy->rwsem has already been taken by store(). However, the boost update is strictly per-policy and does not access shared state or iterate over all policies. Since policy->rwsem is already held, this is enough to serialize against concurrent topology changes for the current policy. Remove the cpus_read_lock() to resolve the lockdep warning and avoid unnecessary locking. [1] ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc6-debug-gb01fc4eca73c #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ power-profiles-/588 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffb3a7d910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: store_local_boost+0x56/0xd0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8b6e5a12c380 (&policy->rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: store+0x37/0x90 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&policy->rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_write+0x29/0xb0 cpufreq_online+0x7e8/0xa40 cpufreq_add_dev+0x82/0xa0 subsys_interface_register+0x148/0x160 cpufreq_register_driver+0x15d/0x260 amd_pstate_register_driver+0x36/0x90 amd_pstate_init+0x1e7/0x270 do_one_initcall+0x68/0x2b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x231/0x270 kernel_init+0x15/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #1 (subsys mutex#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xc2/0x930 subsys_interface_register+0x7f/0x160 cpufreq_register_driver+0x15d/0x260 amd_pstate_register_driver+0x36/0x90 amd_pstate_init+0x1e7/0x270 do_one_initcall+0x68/0x2b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x231/0x270 kernel_init+0x15/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ed/0x1850 lock_acquire.part.0+0x69/0x1b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 store_local_boost+0x56/0xd0 store+0x50/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x132/0x200 vfs_write+0x2b3/0x590 ksys_write+0x74/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x56/0x5e Signed-off-by: Seyediman Seyedarab <ImanDevel@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250513015726.1497-1-ImanDevel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

asj and others added 30 commits September 29, 2015 16:29

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_add_one to btrfs_sysfs_add_mounted

96f3136

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_sysfs_remove_one to btrfs_sysfs_remove_mounted

6618a59

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_add_device to btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link

e3bd697

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: rename btrfs_kobj_rm_device to btrfs_sysfs_rm_device_link

3257604

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: rename super_kobj to fsid_kobj

c1b7e47

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: SB read failure should return EIO for __bread failure

92fc03f

This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB, instead of EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: add helper for closing one device

f190aa4

Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> [reworded subject and changelog] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Btrfs: pass the error code to the btrfs_std_error and log ret

0aee754

This patch will log return value of add/del_qgroup_relation() and pass the err code of btrfs_run_qgroups to the btrfs_std_error(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: device path change must be logged

defa97a

From the issue diagnosable point of view, log if the device path is changed. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: add missing brelse when superblock checksum fails

e6aea8e

looks like oversight, call brelse() when checksum fails. further down the code in the non error path we do call brelse() and so we don't see brelse() in the goto error.. paths. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: optimize check for stale device

0812a51

optimize check for stale device to only be checked when there is device added or changed. If there is no update to the device, there is no need to call btrfs_free_stale_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: clean up and optimize __check_raid_min_device()

3f7d4c2

__check_raid_min_device() which was pealed from btrfs_rm_device() maintianed its original code to show the block move. This patch cleans up __check_raid_min_device(). Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_find_device_by_user_input()

b737e10

btrfs_rm_device() has a section of the code which can be replaced btrfs_find_device_by_user_input() Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

Btrfs: make use of btrfs_scratch_superblocks() in btrfs_rm_device()

cef4787

With the previous patches now the btrfs_scratch_superblocks() is ready to be used in btrfs_rm_device() so use it. Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

kdave pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 12, 2025

Merge tag 'kvm-riscv-fixes-6.15-1' of https://github.com/kvm-riscv/linux

6a74470

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.15, take #1 - Add missing reset of smstateen CSRs

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