Fix for bucket_path security vulnerability

This is a fix for Bugs #13553, #13418, #13511. The bucket_path parameter
allowed control over where the filebucket will try to read and write to.
The only place available to stop this parameter is in the resolution
from a URI to an indirectory terminus. The bucket_path is used
internally for local filebuckets and so cannot be removed completely
without a larger change to the design.

Conflicts:

	lib/puppet/network/http/api/v1.rb
	spec/unit/network/http/api/v1_spec.rb

Conflicts resolved by modifying the patch to fit the use of
Puppet::Indirector::Request in the code.

lib/puppet/network/http/api/v1.rb

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ def uri2indirection(http_method, uri, params)
     method = indirection_method(http_method, indirection)
 
     params[:environment] = environment
+    params.delete(:bucket_path)
 
     raise ArgumentError, "No request key specified in #{uri}" if key == "" or key.nil?
 

spec/unit/network/http/api/v1_spec.rb

@@ -43,6 +43,14 @@ class V1RestApiTester
       @tester.uri2indirection("GET", "/env/foo/bar", {:environment => "otherenv"}).environment.should == Puppet::Node::Environment.new("env")
     end
 
+    it "should not pass a buck_path parameter through (See Bugs #13553, #13518, #13511)" do
+      @tester.uri2indirection("GET", "/env/foo/bar", { :bucket_path => "/malicious/path" }).options.should_not include({ :bucket_path => "/malicious/path" })
+    end
+
+    it "should pass allowed parameters through" do
+      @tester.uri2indirection("GET", "/env/foo/bar", { :allowed_param => "value" }).options.should include({ :allowed_param => "value" })
+    end
+
     it "should use the second field of the URI as the indirection name" do
       @tester.uri2indirection("GET", "/env/foo/bar", {}).indirection_name.should == :foo
     end